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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The coordination of firm behavior in oligopolies has 
remained one of the key issues of industrial organization. 
Most economists would agree that coordination among firms is 
often difficult to sustain. In fact, many theories predict 
that coordination cannot be achieved (e.g., prisoner's 
dilemma) because the conflict between collective and indi­
vidual interests directs firms to choose strategies away from 
the cooperative ideal. Since these theories are not consis­
tent with observed cartel stability, however, several models 
(most notably, Friedman (1971) ) were developed to explain how 
noncooperative equilibria could support collusion. These 
models rely on punishment mechanisms to sustain cooperation, 
where punishments refer to actions that drive players' payoffs 
below the level they would achieve under cooperation. The 
problem with these models is that punishments are so severe 
that defection and punishment are never witnessed. Conse­
quently, one set of theories predicts that cooperation is 
impossible to sustain, whereas another set predicts that it is 
perfectly sustainable. 
How can we reconcile these two extreme predictions with 
the fact that cartels often enter periods of internal break­
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down (such as price wars), only to re-establish unity at some 
later date? Several recent game-theoretic models addressing 
this question focus on the effects of demand movements on 
oligopoly coordination. The models fall into two categories 
with the key difference between them being whether demand 
movements are observed or unobserved. These models, which 
Slade (1990) classified as cyclical and imperfect monitoring 
models, show that cooperation can be sustained across fluc­
tuations in demand by relying on periodic price wars. There­
fore, although defections from the cooperative solution never 
actually occur, imperfect monitoring and cyclical models 
predict that behavior mimicking cartel instability will occur 
following specific shifts of demand. 
Much previous empirical evidence on the effects of demand 
movements on oligopoly coordination derives from structure-
conduct-performance paradigm (SCPP) analyses of the business 
cycle. This evidence relies upon econometric specifications 
that posit ad hoc linear relationships between proxies for 
market power and the business cycle, with little or no 
theoretical support for such specifications. Furthermore, 
since these studies often use data across several industries, 
important industry-specific characteristics are often ignored. 
In response to these weaknesses of the SCPP, critics have 
recently embraced the new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO) approach. The two principle benefits of NEIO studies 
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are that empirical relationships are derived from a well-
defined analytical foundation and that research focuses on the 
idiosyncracies of specific industries. 
One industry in which fluctuations in demand appear to 
have affected coordination is the 1930s rayon industry. 
Scherer and Ross (1990) noted that coordination likely existed 
among rayon producers throughout the 1930s. Moreover, 
Markham's (1952) study of the industry concluded that the 
relationships among sellers in the industry produced neither a 
perfectly competitive nor a monopoly price; but rather, 
probably led to a price that varied between the two over the 
course of the business cycle. 
This dissertation examines the effects of anticipated and 
unanticipated demand shifts on the degree of oligopoly coordi­
nation in the 1930s rayon industry. Chapter 2 discusses 
recent game-theoretic work on the effects of anticipated and 
unanticipated demand movements. Chapter 3 discusses some of 
the relevant empirical work, focusing on those models that 
develop measures of the degree of oligopoly coordination. 
Chapter 4 derives an empirical model which is used to test for 
the predictions of the models presented in Chapter 2. The 
model developed in Chapter 4 will be applied to rayon industry 
data of the 1930s. Accordingly, the relevance of the 1930s 
rayon industry to the issue at hand and the intended data set 
are discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses the esti-
4 
nation results from the application of the empirical model. 
The empirical model developed in Chapter 4, however, requires 
quite restrictive assumptions regarding the role of antici­
pated demand movements. Consequently, focusing on the common 
features of the two cyclical models, an extension of the 
model is developed and estimated in Chapter 7. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, though, price leadership and inventories likely 
played dominant roles in the rayon industry of the 1930s. 
These two issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
A summary is provided in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
Recent game-theoretic models of the effects of demand 
movements on oligopoly coordination are classified as either 
imperfect monitoring or cyclical models. This chapter reviews 
these two classes of models, the main distinction between them 
being whether shifts of demand are anticipated or unantici­
pated. 
Imperfect Monitoring Models 
Imperfect monitoring models assume firms are not able to 
directly monitor their rivals actions and so must infer the 
degree of compliance with collusive agreements on the basis of 
indicators that can be observed. Stigler (1964) was one of 
the first to introduce this notion of imperfect observability. 
He viewed secret price cutting as damaging to the survival of 
a cartel and envisioned the cartel policing the actions of its 
members in order to deter such defections. However, since 
firm behavior is not directly observable, Stigler argued that 
any defections from the cartel agreement have to be inferred 
from market evidence. For example, firms might believe that a 
rival has secretly cut its price if they observe a significant 
drop in their own sales. Stigler's arguments created the 
foundation for later game-theoretic treatments. 
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Perhaps the best known extension of Stigler's imperfect 
observability model is the traditional trigger price model of 
Green and Porter (1984). They assumed a homogeneous product 
market with a fixed number of quantity-setting firms, among 
which collusion takes the form of a set of output quotas, 
while cheating corresponds to overproduction. Moreover, it is 
assumed that each firm is unable to observe rival output 
levels. They can, however, observe the market clearing price. 
Whereas Stigler did not specifically address the role of 
market demand fluctuations. Green and Porter assumed that 
demand has a stochastic (unanticipated) component which causes 
shifts of the demand curve. Absent this stochastic term, any 
deviation from the cartel solution could be inferred from a 
fall in the market price.^ Inferences become more difficult, 
however, when demand shocks enter the model. A sudden fall in 
the market price might be explained by either an unexpected 
decline in market demand or rival cheating. Without further 
information it is impossible to determine which factor led to 
the price reduction. 
How might the cartel operate in such an environment? 
Green and Porter argued that the cartel would adopt a trigger-
price strategy as a means of deterring cheating. If the price 
igince rival output levels cannot be observed directly, 
firms must rely on indirect evidence of quota compliance, just 
as Stigler argued. 
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ever dropped below some trigger level, the cartel would infer 
that such a fall was too great to be due to a random shock to 
demand. As such, the cartel would reach the conclusion that 
cheating had occurred, and a punishment phase would begin. 
The punishment phase, which involves more competitive conduct, 
would last for a finite period of time.^ Once the punishment 
phase had run its course, though, unity would be restored. 
The cartel's problem then becomes choosing optimal production 
levels for both the cooperative and reversionary regimes, a 
trigger-price, and a length of punishment phase to maximize 
total industry expected discounted profits, subject to the 
constraint that firms not deviate from their quota levels. 
And, as Green and Porter showed, the optimal output level in 
cooperative periods would exceed the one-shot joint profit-
maximizing level. This conclusion is also supported by a 
simpler model developed by Porter (1983a). 
Any firm contemplating cheating faces a trade-off. On 
the one hand, cheating will lead to an immediate increase in 
profits; but on the other hand, it will increase the likeli­
hood of entering a punishment phase. Yet given that the 
optimal trigger-price strategy poses a threat of punishment 
^Similar to Friedman (1971), it is assumed that firms 
produce at the Cournot output level during punishment phases. 
Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1986), however, showed that 
under more general conditions Cournot punishments are not 
optimal. 
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great enough to deter any cheating, compliance with the cartel 
quota then becomes each firms' Nash equilibrium strategy and, 
assuming firms are rational, each knows this to be the best 
strategy of every other. However, a puzzling result occurs 
when demand is shifted downward by a large negative shock, 
causing market price to be driven below the trigger-price. In 
order to maintain a credible threat of punishment, the cartel 
will be forced to revert to the punishment phase, even though 
each firm knows the equilibrium strategy of its rivals' is not 
to cheat. Consequently, price wars (and other features of 
punishment phases) are not the result of cheating, but in 
fact, are the result of significantly large unanticipated 
downward shifts of demand. Empirical support for this theory 
would require a demonstration that periodic reversions to 
more-competitive behavior tend to follow significant unanti­
cipated reductions of demand. 
Cyclical Models 
Cyclical models focus on the effects of the business 
cycle on oligopoly coordination. Unlike Green and Porter's 
imperfect monitoring model, though, cyclical models assume 
firms are able to observe contemporaneous shifts in demand. 
Yet depending on the nature of these shifts, different 
predictions are obtained. 
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One of the more recent cyclical models is that of 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). They argued that coordination 
among price-setting firms in a homogeneous product industry is 
most likely to breakdown in periods of high demand (booms). 
That is, firms in such an industry are more likely to undercut 
their competitors' prices when they observe a high level of 
demand. This result, however, is dependent on Rotemberg and 
Saloner's assumption of identical and independently distri­
buted demand shocks, which implies that observed "strong" 
demand today will likely be followed by weaker (i.e., closer 
to normal) demand tomorrow. This implies that the gains from 
chiselling in boom periods might outweigh the expected losses 
from punishments, which are meted out in the future when 
demand is expected to be relatively weaker. As a result, 
cheating is most likely to occur in periods of relatively high 
demand. 
In such an environment, Rotemberg and Saloner showed that 
the cartel's optimal strategy is to lower the collusive price 
during periods of high demand. This reduces the gains from 
secret price cutting and, in combination with credible threats 
of punishment for defection, eliminates the incentive to 
cheat. Accordingly, Rotemberg and Saloner predict that 
cooperation will be maintained over the business cycle, yet 
behavior mimicking increased competition will occur in periods 
of high demand. 
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Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), on the other hand, 
argued that Rotemberg and Saloner's assumption of i.i.d. 
demand shocks is unrealistic. In particular, this assumption 
implies that expectations of future demand do not change over 
the business cycle. This means that any firm operating during 
a boom period will expect demand to return to a normal level 
in the next period; yet intuition tells us that most firms 
expect boom's, once started, to continue for a few periods 
before normal demand is restored. In such a case, it is no 
longer clear that firms wish to cheat during expansionary 
periods, since the consequence of doing so will be the sacri­
fice of continued expected high collusive profits throughout 
the remainder of the boom. In fact, Haltiwanger and 
Harrington showed that cheating is most likely to occur when 
demand is falling, since the punishments from cheating will 
then be meted out over periods in which demand is expected to 
continue falling. In order to sustain cooperation over the 
business cycle, we might then expect the cartel to reduce the 
cooperative price during periods of falling demand.^ 
Both of the above cyclical models assume demand is fully 
observable in the current period. Any empirical model deve-
^It must be stressed, though, that while Rotemberg and 
Saloner's model tied the degree of cooperation to the level of 
demand the Haltiwanger and Harrington model tied cooperation 
to changes in demand. As a result, the predictions of the two 
models are not directly comparable. 
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loped to test their predictions will necessarily have an error 
component, however Haltiwanger and Harrington claim that their 
model can be adapted to allow a stochastic, unobservable, 
shock to current demand. In such a case, it is the change in 
the expectation (or rather, anticipation) of future demand 
upon which firms base their current conduct decisions. That 
is, in the case of stochastic demand, Haltiwanger and 
Harrington's model predicts that coordination will fall during 
periods when the anticipation of future demand is falling. 
Although Rotemberg and Saloner did not claim a similar 
extension to their model, I will proceed under the assumption 
that identifying the effects of the level of anticipated 
demand on the degree of coordination may shed some light on 
the predictions of the Rotemberg and Saloner model. In 
particular, the extension of Rotemberg and Saloner's model to 
allow a stochastic demand suggests that coordination will fall 
during those periods when the level of future demand is 
anticipated to be high. 
Green and Porter linked oligopoly coordination to the 
unanticipated portion of demand, whereas the two cyclical 
models just mentioned link coordination to the anticipated 
portion of demand. It is appealing, therefore, to see if 
oligopoly coordination is systematically related to either or 
both anticipated and unanticipated demand. In the next 
chapter I discuss some of the empirical literature related to 
12 
this issue, focusing on those NEIO studies that develop 
measures of the degree of oligopoly coordination. 
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CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Case studies of industries with significant market power 
have remained a cornerstone of empirical industrial organi­
zation. Prior to the late 1970s, research embraced the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm. The majority of SCPP 
studies addressed the relationship between market concen­
tration and industry profit rates and tended to support the 
hypothesis of a positive correlation between concentration and 
profitability. Articles written in this tradition used cross-
sectional data to estimate ad hoc relationships between 
industry performance and structure (e.g., specifying profit 
rates as a linear function of concentration ratios and 
"control" variables), though little theoretical support was 
given for such relationships.'' Moreover, it was assumed that 
performance could be adequately proxied by profit rates, 
price-cost margins, or other observable indexes available from 
accounting data. 
Due to an increasing awareness of the limitations of SCPP 
techniques, the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
began to gain acceptance in the field in the late 1970s. 
''Cowling and Waterson (197 6) do provide theoretical 
support for the positive relationship between profit rates and 
concentration. 
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Unlike the ad hoc specifications used in SCPP studies, the 
empirical relationships estimated in NEIO studies are derived 
from theoretical models of optimizing behavior. Moreover, 
recognizing that industries have important and unique 
characteristics, NEIO analysts use time series data to study 
individual industries. Finally, NEIO studies treat perfor­
mance measures as parameters to be estimated rather than 
inferred from accounting data.^ This chapter reviews the 
relevant NEIO and SCPP studies of market power, with parti­
cular emphasis placed upon NEIO studies addressing imperfect 
monitoring and cyclical issues. However, since NEIO models 
seek to estimate the degree of oligopoly coordination, I begin 
with the development of an adequate measure. 
Measuring the Degree of Oligopoly Coordination 
Oligopolies with high degrees of coordination exercise 
significant market power. The issue then becomes how to 
measure the degree of market power in an industry. While SCPP 
papers rely on measures of market power obtained from 
accounting data, NEIO studies generally infer market power 
from estimated parameters of an econometric model. Key 
parameters usually include ones interpretable as "conjectural 
variations". The following example will illustrate the role 
^Bresnahan (1989) and Schmalensee (1990) discuss in 
greater detail the differences between SCPP and NEIO studies. 
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played by conjectural variation terms in the measurement of 
market power. 
Suppose n firms in an industry producing a homogeneous 
product face a market demand given by: 
P = f{Q, Y) , (3.1) 
where P is market price, Q is market output, and Y is a vector 
of exogenous variables. Next, assume each firm's total cost 
is given by: 
C^ = C^{q^,W) (3.2) 
where is firm i's level of output, and W is a vector of 
exogenous variables common across firms. The first-order 
condition for maximization of firm i's profits subject to 
(3.1) is: 
" 
Equation (3.3) can be written as: 
^ 
which becomes: 
4  1 + -^ 1 = AfCj 1=1, . . . . ,n, :3.5) 
where the left-hand side of (3.5) is firm i's perceived 
marginal revenue, Ô is the price elasticity of demand, and 6;, 
16 
defined as (dQ/dqiX^/Q), is firm i's conjectural elasticity of 
market output with respect to its own output. The range of 
possible values for parameterizes a range of oligopoly 
solution concepts. For example, if all Oj's equal zero, firms 
perceive their marginal revenues to be equal to price. The 
result is then a competitive outcome in which price equals 
marginal cost. Alternatively, joint profit maximization is 
supported with all G^'s equal to one, since each firm would 
then set marginal cost equal to industry marginal revenue. 
Cournot conjectures correspond to one particular intermediate 
case, in which firms anticipate no rival responses to their 
own output changes. In this case, dQ/dq^ equals one; which 
implies 6^ equals q^/Q, the i'^ firm's market share.^ Estimates 
of 0i can then be used to measure the degree to which firm 
behavior deviates from that of price taking, since price 
taking is consistent with equal to zero. 
Specifying 0^ and MC^ as functions of exogenous and/or 
endogenous variables, equations (3.1) and (3.5) can be esti­
mated, provided conditions for econometric identification are 
met. Inferences on market power can then be made. However, 
®Since we are dealing with a single period, static model, 
rivals are not provided the opportunity to respond to firm i's 
chosen strategy. Consequently, the interpretation of as a 
measure of anticipated rival response is troubling to many 
people. Even in a static setting, though, conjectural 
elasticities are still useful as a parameterization of the 
degree of market power. 
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due to the lack of firm-specific data, many researchers are 
forced to address the problem from an industry level/ In the 
next section a few examples are provided, two of which test 
for the predictions of Green and Porter's trigger-price model. 
Appelbaum (1982) justified the use of industry data by 
assuming that firms have marginal costs that are constant with 
respect to firm output quantities (at a level common to all 
firms). Specifically, each firm's cost function is assumed to 
be given by: 
where C(W), a function of input prices, is independent of i. 
Each firm solving (3.5) would then equate its perceived mar­
ginal revenue to the industry marginal cost (given by C(W)), 
and this, in conjunction with a common price and market demand 
elasticity across firms, implies = 0, in equilibrium, for 
all i. Thus, the industry supply relationship analogous to 
(3.5) becomes: 
which depends only on market-level data. In equilibrium all 
^Iwata (1974) was able to estimate conjectural variations 
using firm-level information from the Japanese flat glass 
industry. 
Relevant NEIO Studies 
cHqi,^ = QiCiW) + G^iW) i=l, ,n, (3.6) 
(3.7) 
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firms share the same conjectural elasticity, and estimates of 
the common value of 0 will indicate departures from the 
perfectly competitive (0 = 0) or pure monopoly (0=1) 
solutions. 
In order to improve the efficiency of the estimation 
procedure by taking advantage of cross-equation parameter 
restrictions, Appelbaum extended the basic model by incor­
porating aggregate input demand functions. Using Shephard's 
Lemma, in conjunction with the cost function in (3.6), firm 
i's demand for the jth input is then given by: 
_ _ àcHQi.m _ „ ac(« ^ doHw) i-l n, ,, P, 
» Wj awj J=1 S, 
where Wj is the price of the jth input. The industry demand 
for the jth input is then: 
Accordingly, Appelbaum's model consisted of a set of input 
demand functions (3.9), an industry supply relationship (3.7), 
and an output demand function (3.1), all of which involved 
only industry-level variables. 
Before the model could be estimated, though, functional 
forms for the system of equations were needed. Restricting 
inputs to labor, capital, and materials, Appelbaum assumed an 
industry cost function of the generalized Leontief form. And 
19 
further, 0 was parameterized as a linear function of certain 
exogenous variables of the model as a means of allowing for 
changes in conduct with changing market conditions. These 
restrictions, in conjunction with a log-linear demand and the 
industry supply relationship (3.7), led to a system of five 
equations. This system was estimated by the full information 
maximum likelihood procedure for the rubber, textile, elec­
trical machinery, and tobacco industries. The hypothesis of 
competitive behavior was rejected for the electrical machinery 
and tobacco industries, but could not be rejected for the 
rubber and textile industries. 
Porter's (1983b) study of the Joint Executive Committee 
(JEC) railroad cartel was the first to test some of the 
predictions of Green and Porter's trigger-price model. Speci­
fically, he sought to determine if switches between collusive 
and competitive behavior could be detected in JEC data of the 
1880s. However, since Green and Porter's model focused on 
quantity-setting firms, whereas the JEC was a price-setting 
cartel, a slight modification of the theory was needed. 
Porter assumed a price-setting industry similar to 
Stigler's (1964), in which firms are unable to directly 
observe their rivals' prices. They can, however, infer rival 
cheating from changes in their own sales. That is, if a 
firm's sales suddenly fall, it might infer that such a 
reduction were due to a rival's secret price cut. And 
20 
assuming punishment periods are associated with Bertrand 
behavior, firms would resort to marginal cost pricing 
following such an inference. If there are no stochastic 
shocks to demand, then any firm contemplating cheating today 
must weigh the immediate gains of secret price cutting against 
the discounted difference between future collusive profits and 
the competitive profits characteristic of the punishment 
phase. 
Next suppose that demand is subject to stochastic shocks, 
so that declining sales could be the result of rival price 
cutting or of a negative shock to demand. It might then be 
possible that a noncooperative equilibrium could support 
prices above marginal cost through the use of a trigger 
strategy. For example, the industry might have a price leader 
that could signal upcoming reversionary episodes whenever its 
sales fall below some trigger amount. The "trigger-output", 
collusive price, and length of punishment must then be chosen 
to maximize expected discounted industry profits, subject to 
the constraint that no firm deviates from the collusive price. 
Thus, although no firm deviates in equilibrium, price wars do 
occur whenever there are large unanticipated reductions in 
demand. As in the case of the quantity-setting, trigger-price 
version of the model, equilibrium would be characterized by 
periodic switches between competitive and cooperative 
21 
behavior.® 
Porter's model of the JEC, unlike Appelbaum's, allowed 
firms to have cost functions with nonconstant marginal cost 
given by: 
where is firm i's output in period t, is the fixed cost 
to firm i in period t, X is the elasticity of total variable 
cost with respect to output, and a^ is a firm-specific cost 
shifting parameter. Among other things, a^ reflects the role 
that input prices play in shifting the cost curve. Weighting 
the individual firm supply relationships, given by equation 
(3.5), by market shares and adding them up across the n firms, 
the industry supply relationship then becomes: 
where Sit is firm i's market share in period t, MC^ (q^J is firm 
i's marginal cost, and 0^ is the market share weighted average 
of the n firm conjectural elasticities. Given the functional 
forms that Porter chose, equilibrium market shares are such 
that the right-hand side of equation (3.11) can be written in 
terms of industry output only. Specifically, equation (3.11) 
®Porter (1985) provides a more detailed explanation of 
how price-setting behavior can be modelled in a "trigger-
output" framework in the manner of Stigler. 
cHQit) = ^iQit + ^ it ' ' ' • .n, (3.10) 
(3.11) 
22 
becomes : 
13-12) 
where Qt is market output and D is a function of the para­
meters of the n firms' cost functions.^ 
The model, consisting of equation (3.12) and Porter's 
counterpart to equation (3.1), can then be estimated using 
industry data. The difference between cooperative and rever­
sionary periods is a difference in the value of 6^, the 
industry conduct parameter. Since the classification of 
sample periods between the two regimes is unknown apriori, it 
must be estimated along with the values of 6^ characteristic 
of both regimes and the model's other parameters. Porter 
achieved this using a maximum likelihood, switching regres­
sions procedure. His results showed that switches between 
competitive and non-competitive pricing did take place several 
times throughout the sample period, though the cause of these 
switches was unclear." Therefore, Porter's empirical findings 
support the theory, to the extent that switches in conduct are 
^See the appendix for the proof that the share weighted 
average of the n-firm marginal costs can be written as the 
right-hand side of equation (3.12). 
"Porter points out that, although unanticipated demand 
fluctuations could explain these switches between collusive 
and competitive pricing, unanticipated supply fluctuations 
could also explain such switches. 
23 
evidenced, but they do not purport to determine the cause of 
the switches. 
Other research, however, has supported Green and Porter's 
claim that significant unanticipated demand shocks do cause 
breakdowns in coordination. Baker's (1989) analysis of the 
U.S. steel industry of the 1930s is a clear example. In this 
study. Baker estimated a market demand and industry supply 
relationship, showing that episodes of more-competitive 
behavior tended to follow significant decreases in market 
demand. 
The empirical model I develop in Chapter 4 closely 
follows the approach used by Baker, so a thorough review of 
Baker's model is in order. To begin, since the trigger-price 
model relies on unanticipated demand shocks. Baker assumed 
that market demand has an additive disturbance term (e), which 
is independently and identically distributed, such that (3.1) 
becomes : 
P = f(Q, Y) + €. (3.13) 
The left-hand side of (3.3), firm i's perceived marginal 
revenue, can be written as: 
MRHqi,y) = U - Qi) P + QiiP0-^) i=l/ .n, (3.14) 
where, again, is firm i's conjectural elasticity. Denoting 
the industry marginal revenue by MR, equation (3.14) becomes: 
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MR-( y) = (1 - 8J P + 1=1,....,n. (3.15) 
Thus firm i's perceived marginal revenue can be thought of as 
a weighted average of price and industry marginal revenue with 
the weights given by (1 - 0i) and Gj. 
Unlike Porter and Appelbaum, who derived industry-level 
relationships from well-defined firm cost functions, Baker 
simply assumed that marginal cost can be written as a function 
of industry output. This industry marginal cost function, 
denoted C(Q,W,v), is dependent upon market output Q, a vector 
W of cost-shifting variables, and v, a random shock to 
industry costs assumed to be uncorrelated with e. Aggregating 
the n firm marginal revenue equations, the industry supply 
relationship is given by: 
P = Q{P-MR) +C{Q,W,v). (3.16) 
Baker assumed that both market demand and industry 
marginal cost are log-linear, such that they become: 
In P = ttg + «lin Q + ocgln Y + e, (3.17) 
and 
In C{Q, W, v) = Po + Piln Q + Pain W + v, (3.18) 
where for simplicity the vectors Y and W have been reduced to 
scalars. Equation (3.17) implies that (P - MR) = -ttiP, which 
in conjunction with equation (3.18), simplifies the supply 
relationship (3.16) to: 
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In P = Pg - ln(l + «10) + p^ln Q + Pain W + v. (3.19) 
Using the result that for values of x close to zero, the 
natural log of (1 + x) is approximately equal to x, equation 
(3.19) reduces to: 
In P - Pg - «10 + Piln Q + Pain W + v. (3.20) 
The trigger-price story predicts that cartels behave more 
competitively (that is, exhibit conduct consistent with a 
lower value of 0) when there is a significantly negative 
unanticipated shift of demand, causing price to fall below the 
trigger. Baker modelled this by assuming the following 
relationship: 
0 = 0* + | i  (e)  , (3.21) 
where 0* is a constant, and ]i{e) depends discontinuously upon 
the demand shock e. Large negative values of e, which reflect 
large unanticipated reductions in demand, are assumed to 
"trigger" a decrease in the value of p(e), causing 0 to fall. 
Using (3.21), equation (3.20) can then be written as: 
In P = Tig + Ttiii(e) + Piln Q + Pain W + v, (3.22) 
where the intercept term jïq equals (Po - ajB*) and ïïj equals 
(-CCi) . 
Before (3.22) could be estimated, though, two additional 
modifications were needed. First, since the random shock e is 
unobservable, the residuals from the estimation of (3.17) were 
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used as consistent estimates of e; and second, a functional 
form for ^(e) was specified. Specifically, since the trigger-
price model predicts that only large negative values of e 
should trigger a reduction in p(€). Baker assumed the 
following : 
H(€) = [vl*)DUM, (3.23) 
where p* is a scalar to be estimated, and DUM is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the residual from the estimation of 
the demand equation (3.17) is large and negative. That is, 
D m ^ l l t e < - T s  (3.24, 
= 0 if e -Ts, 
where e is an element of the residual vector from the esti­
mated demand equation, s is the standard error of regression 
of the demand equation, and T is a scalar chosen to maximize 
the likelihood of observing the supply relationship. Given 
this specification, a significantly negative estimate of p* 
supports the trigger-price claim that periods of cooperation 
among firms (characterized by 0 equal to 0*) may have been 
punctuated by episodes of more competitive behavior (when 0 is 
driven down to (0* + u*)), following large and unexpected 
decreases in demand. Substituting (3.23) into (3.22), the 
supply relationship can then be written as the following: 
In P = Ttg + u^{\i*)DUM + Piln Q + Pjln W + v. (3.25) 
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Since e and v were assumed uncorrelated, single equation 
estimation procedures were simultaneously applied to equations 
(3.17) and (3.25). First, equation (3.17) was estimated by 
instrumental variable techniques, and estimates of the a's, 
the standard error of regression (s), and a vector of 
residuals were obtained. Second, using the residuals and the 
standard error of regression from (3.17) in the definition of 
DUM, equation (3.25) was also estimated using an instrumental 
variable technique for a variety of values of T. Final 
estimates were taken to be those associated with the value of 
T that maximized the likelihood function of equation (3.25). 
Baker's results from the U.S. steel industry showed 
and the coefficient on DUM from equation (3.25) to be signi­
ficantly negative, implying that ]a* was negative for the 
period studied.As such, the data supports the claim that 
during those periods when there were large unanticipated 
reductions in demand (i.e., DUM equalled one) the steel 
industry reverted to episodes of more-competitive conduct. 
Consequently, although Porter was unable to show why switches 
between cooperation and reversion took place in the Joint 
^^Since 0* and Po cannot be "disentangled" from one 
another through the estimate of ttq/ 8 is not identified. 
However, since consistent estimates of and can be 
obtained, p* can be consistently estimated, and the question 
of whether or not large negative demand shocks triggered more-
competitive behavior can be answered. I will show in chapter 
4 that if demand is linear in price and quantity and marginal 
cost is independent of quantity, then 0 can be identified. 
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Executive Committee, Baker's analysis of the U.S. steel 
industry did establish a link between reversionary episodes 
and periods of significant unanticipated demand reductions. 
Finally, since the purpose of this dissertation is to 
test if oligopoly conduct is systematically related to both 
anticipated and unanticipated demand shifts, I end this 
section by discussing the paper by Stiegert, Azzam, and 
Brorsen (1990), which addressed the effects of anticipated and 
unanticipated input supply movements on oligopsony coordi­
nation. Briefly, Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen sought to 
determine if recent behavior in the beef packing industry 
could be explained by shifts in cattle supply. The empirical 
model they used, originally developed by Roberts (1984), used 
Hotelling's lemma to arrive at a system of output supply and 
input demand equations. 
The industry conjectural elasticity (of input buyers) was 
then assumed to be a logistic function of anticipated and 
unanticipated supply, which were estimated from a fed cattle 
supply equation. Specifically, the authors regressed current 
fed cattle quantity on lagged quantity, lagged corn prices, 
and three seasonal dummy variables. Following Barro (1977), 
anticipated supply was then estimated as predicted fed cattle 
quantity, whereas unanticipated supply was estimated by the 
residuals from the estimated equation. Upon estimation of the 
system of supply and demand equations, the coefficient of 
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anticipated supply was significantly positive, suggesting that 
the degree of oligopsony coordination rises with anticipated 
increases in supply; whereas the coefficient of unanticipated 
supply was significantly negative, suggesting that coor­
dination is more difficult in periods when unanticipated 
supply increases. 
Relevant SCPP Studies 
As discussed in the section above, several NEIO studies 
have addressed some of the trigger-price issues. However, no 
NEIO studies have thus far been done on the issues pertaining 
to the cyclical models. Yet SCPP studies, to the extent that 
they focus on the role of the business cycle in determining 
the degree of market power, have dealt with cyclical model 
issues. Moreover, the evidence generated from these studies 
supports the Haltiwanger and Harrington view that oligopoly 
coordination falls during recessions. 
Neumann, Bobel, and Haid (1983), for example, studied the 
behavior of the price-cost margin using yearly data (1965-
1977) from 283 West German joint stock companies. Approxi­
mating the price-cost margin as the difference between 
industry revenue and current expenses for labor and raw 
materials divided by equity capital, they assumed it depends 
on several explanatory variables. These variables are defined 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Variable names and definitions for the Neumann, 
Bobel, and Haid model 
Variable Name Definition 
P 
C3 
EX 
IM 
VI 
CART 
PD 
RISK 
G 
LEV 
Price-cost margin 
Three-firm concentration ratio 
Ratio of industry exports to total industry 
sales 
Ratio of imports of commodities produced by 
the industry to total industry sales 
Degree of vertical integration, as proxied by 
value added as a proportion of sales for 
the firm divided by value added as a pro­
portion of sales for the industry 
Number of West German registered cartels 
Degree of product differentiation, as proxied 
by the number of West German trademarks 
registered by the firm 
Amount of risk , as proxied by the variance 
and covariance (with profits of all West 
German firms) of firm profits 
Size of the firm, as proxied by the natural 
log of the total value of the firm's assets 
Rate of growth of firm sales 
Degree of leverage, as proxied by the 
debt/equity ratio 
Given the definitions from Table 1, the following relationship 
was estimated: 
P = Po + PiC5 + PgEZ + P3IM + P4VI + P 5 CART 
+ PePD + ^jRISK + PgS + pgC? + PiqLW. (3.26) 
The estimation results showed that EX, IM, and S affect 
the price-cost margin negatively, whereas all of the other 
variables affected P positively. Moreover, all explanatory 
variables, except CART, were significant at the five percent 
level.Therefore, referring to the variable G, this suggests 
that the price-cost margin is most likely to fall during those 
periods when firm sales are falling (i.e., during business 
slumps); and if lower price-cost margins are associated with 
lower degrees of oligopoly coordination, their results support 
the Haltiwanger and Harrington claim that it is more difficult 
to collude during periods of slack demand. 
Like the Neumann, Bobel, and Haid study, the paper by 
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986) also found a positive 
correlation between the price-cost margin and increases in 
industry demand, although the results were less supportive 
with respect to movements of aggregate demand. To begin, they 
used data from 284 U.S. industries covering the years of 1958 
to 1981, and a price-cost margin measured as: 
PCM= (3.27) 
S + AI 
where S is the value of sales, AI is the change in the value 
of inventories, P is payroll costs, and M is materials cost. 
To capture the effects of demand fluctuations on PCM, 
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen used the percentage change in 
industry output (which proxied movements of industry demand) 
^In particular, like many previous studies, the Neumann 
et al. paper shows that the degree of concentration in an 
industry positively affects the price-cost margin. 
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and the economy-wide unemployment rate (which proxied move­
ments of aggregate demand) as regressors. Similar to the 
Neumann, Bobel, and Haid paper, they assumed these variables 
enter the regression equation linearly and, in addition, 
included the capital-output ratio (K/Q), the advertising-sales 
ratio (A/S), and the four-firm concentration ratio (C4) in the 
set of explanatory variables. 
Their results showed that both the percentage change in 
industry output and the unemployment rate had a significantly 
positive effect on the price-cost margin. In the case of the 
percentage change in industry output, this suggests that the 
price-cost margin moves procyclically with respect to the 
individual industry demand. However, the positive effect of 
the unemployment rate on PCM does not support the claim that 
coordination falls during general business slumps. In parti­
cular, a rising unemployment rate implies that the economy is 
moving towards a recession, which if the price-cost margin 
moved procylically, would suggest a falling PCM. Yet the 
positive correlation between the unemployment rate and PCM 
fails to support this.^^ Consequently, the Domowitz, Hubbard, 
and Petersen results mildly support the Haltiwanger and 
Harrington results. 
^Although after splitting the data set into two time 
periods, 1958-69 and 1970-81, the authors were able to get a 
significantly negative estimate of the unemployment rate coef­
ficient for the 1958-69 period. 
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Finally, using data collected from 709 United Kingdom 
companies over the 1972 to 1986 period, Machin and Van Reenen 
(1993) regressed a measure of the firm-level profit margin on 
the unemployment rate and found the estimated coefficient to 
be significantly negative, suggesting that the movement of 
firm profits was countercyclical. As such, their results also 
favor the Haltiwanger and Harrington predictions. 
The predictions of Rotemberg and Saloner, however, do 
have some empirical support. In particular, as Rotemberg and 
Saloner discussed, four pieces of evidence support their claim 
that coordination falls during a boom. First, they argued 
that the 1955 price war in the automobile market, which was 
later studied by Bresnahan (1987), corresponded to a boom 
period in the U.S. economy. It is important to note, however, 
that output in the U.S. auto market is quite differentiated 
while the Rotemberg and Saloner analysis was based on the 
assumption of a homogeneous product. Second, they argued that 
periods of reversion in the JEC, as observed by Porter, cor­
responded to periods when substitute transportation (namely, 
the use of ships in the Great Lakes) was largely unavailable. 
They suggested that these periods in which substitutes were 
lacking might then correspond to higher rail shipment demand. 
Third, using a sample of twenty manufacturing industries, they 
found that one particular measure of the price-cost margin was 
countercyclical in more concentrated industries. And fourth. 
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they regressed the yearly growth of real cement prices on the 
rate of growth of GNP and found a significantly negative cor­
relation between the two. It is likely, however, that rele­
vant explanatory variables were excluded from the regression 
equation, suggesting that the estimates could be biased. 
Advocates of the NEIO would be inclined to question the 
findings of SCPP studies of oligopoly coordination and the 
business cycle, but no NEIO work has yet been done in this 
area. The next chapter develops an NEIO model that will be 
used to address both trigger-price and cyclical issues through 
an investigation of the relationship between oligopoly coor­
dination and anticipated and unanticipated demand movements. 
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Since the objective of this research is to use NEIO 
techniques to test for the effects of anticipated and 
unanticipated demand movements on the degree of oligopoly 
coordination, I develop an empirical model by modifying 
Baker's approach. Consider n firms producing in a homogeneous 
product market, in which market demand is subject to 
stochastic shocks. Unlike Baker, though, I assume that firms 
operate under the cost structure imposed by Porter. Firm i's 
costs in period t are then given by: 
where is the i''*' firm's output level in period t, a^^ is a 
firm-specific cost shifting parameter assumed to depend upon 
input prices and an industry-wide random shock, and is a 
firm-specific fixed cost in period t. Given the cost equation 
(4.1), the i"' firm's marginal cost becomes: 
where, for simplicity, I suppress the dependence of a^ on 
and Vf 
Following the approaches taken by Baker and Porter, the 
first-order condition for maximization of firm i's profits is 
then given by: 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
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{1 - = Xa^tQit^ 1=1, ,n, ( 4 . 3 )  
where Ojt is firm i's conjectural elasticity in period t, 
Pt is the price in period t, and MR^ is industry marginal 
revenue in period t. Since I am restricted to using industry 
data, I follow Porter by weighting the n individual supply 
relationships by the appropriate period t market shares and 
summing them over all n firms. The resulting industry supply 
relationship is given by: 
P, = Q,{P, - MRJ + 
= Q^iP, -  MR^) + MC{Q^,W^,v^) ,  (4.4) 
where 0^ is the market share weighted average of all n firm 
conjectural elasticities and "industry marginal cost", denoted 
by MC (Qt, Wt, vj , depends upon market quantity, input prices, 
and the industry-wide cost shock. The proof that the market 
share weighted average of firm marginal costs can be written 
in the form (W,., vj is provided in the appendix. 
The purpose of the model is to discover if anticipated 
and/or unanticipated movements in demand affect oligopoly 
conduct (as measured by 6J. To do this, demand movements (or 
rather, the relative positions of the demand curve) need to be 
separated into appropriate anticipated and unanticipated com-
^"•As stressed in the appendix, the aggregation of firm 
marginal costs into the expression MC(Qt,Wt,vJ requires firms 
to have identical conjectural elasticities. 
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ponents. Accordingly, suppose market demand is given by the 
following: 
where Ô is the price elasticity of demand, and is an 
appropriate price index in period t. 0^/ the quantity that 
would be demanded in period t if (Pt/ZJ were equal to one, is 
the gauge of the "position" or "strength" of the demand curve 
in period t. It is assumed that this position depends upon 
anticipated and unanticipated variables, which I model as: 
Q(. = Wj-Uj-, (4.6) 
where depends upon things observable in period (t-1), and 
as such, represents the anticipated portion of the position of 
the demand curve in period t. On the other hand, u^ is 
unobservable in period (t-1), and consequently represents the 
unanticipated portion of the demand position in period t. 
Assume Ut is given by: 
lit = exp (€ J , (4.7) 
where 
~ N{Q,ol) , 
and Ct is assumed independent of v^. From equation (4.6), if 
Ct is larger than average (i.e., positive), implying that u^ 
exceeds one, Qt will exceed Uf In this case, demand will be 
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stronger (i.e., the position of the demand curve greater) than 
anticipated. Alternatively, if is negative, demand will be 
weaker than anticipated. Thus, positive realizations of 
are associated with actual demand lying to the right of its 
anticipated position; while negative realizations of result 
in demand lying further to the left than anticipated. 
Suppose Ot is given by: 
period (t-1). Substituting (4.7) and (4.8) into (4.6), and 
substituting the result into (4.5) and taking the natural log 
yields : 
where «o equals In A. This is my counterpart to Baker's 
demand function (3.13), where In and represent the 
anticipated and unanticipated parts, respectively, of the 
position of the demand curve in period t. Changes in In 
and/or cause the position of the demand curve to change; 
that is, such changes shift demand. 
Given (4.9), it can be shown that (P^ - MRJ equals 
(-Pt/Ô). After taking natural logs and rearranging, the 
industry supply relationship (4.4) then becomes: 
CO, = yf#, M.8) 
where (Y^^,Y It/ ^2t' YkJ are demand shifters observable in 
( 4 . 9 )  
39 
( A \ 
In Pj. = -In 11 + -y + In V(.) + (A - 1) In 0(.- (4.10) 
Assuming the following functional form for In vj : 
InD^iW^v^) = Po + Pain + + P^ln Kt + (4.11) 
and invoking the approximation ln(l + x) » x for x « 0, the 
supply relationship (4.10) simplifies to the following expres­
sion: 
In Pt = Po - -y + Piln Qt + pgln F/jt + + + Vc (4.12) 
where Pi equals (X - 1) . 
Next, I assume that the anticipated and unanticipated 
components of the demand position affect the degree of oli­
gopoly coordination. Rotemberg and Saloner assume that the 
anticipated position of period t+1 demand (based on infor­
mation available in period t) affects the degree of coordi­
nation in period t. Haltiwanger and Harrington, on the other 
hand, assume that the change in the anticipated position of 
demand (from period t to t+1) affects conduct in period t. 
Finally, realization of Green and Porter's claim requires that 
the unanticipated position of demand in period t-1 affects 
coordination in period t. These three assumptions are incor­
porated in the following specification for the conjectural 
elasticity 6^: 
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0J. = TQ + x^ln ût+i + 1:2 (In - In ûj.) + XjDUM^_^. (4.13) 
The estimate of the anticipated portion of the period t demand 
position is given by: 
In Gif. = + â^ln + + &;^ln (4.14) 
where the â's come from the estimation of the demand equation 
(4.9) . 
Following Baker, I take the residuals from equation (4.9) 
as estimates of the unanticipated portion of the demand 
position in period t and use them to define the dummy variable 
DUMt, which equals one when demand suffers a large unanti­
cipated negative shock.Substituting (4.13) into (4.12), the 
supply relationship to be estimated is then given by: 
In ft = %o + Piln Qt + Pzln f^2t + + P^ln 
+ %iln ût+i + %2(ln ÛJ.+1 " In û^.) + + v^, (4.15) 
where Kq equals (Po - Tq/ô) , equals (-t^/ô), equals 
(-T2/Ô) , and Jtj equals (-T3/Ô) . 
^^Unlike Baker, who assumed conduct in the current period 
is affected by negative demand shocks in the current period, I 
assume negative demand shocks in the previous period affect 
the current degree of coordination. This better suits the 
Green and Porter story. 
The procedure used to construct DUMt is similar to the 
procedure used by Baker and is discussed in the last chapter. 
In my application, however, since supply will be estimated by 
a two stage least squares procedure, the constant T used to 
construct DUM^ will be determined by minimizing the two stage 
least squares objective function corresponding to the 
estimated supply relationship. 
Since the demand function (4.9) and supply relationship 
(4.15) jointly determine and Q^, a simultaneous equation 
estimation procedure is needed; and assuming, like Baker, that 
Ct and Vt are uncorrelated, two stage least squares (2SLS) is 
an appropriate procedure. Equation (4.9) can be estimated 
using 2SLS to obtain estimates of the demand coefficients, the 
standard error of regression, and the residuals; which can 
then be used to construct In (In - In wj, and DUM^.i . 
Using these constructed regressors, the supply relationship 
(4.15) can then be estimated by 2SLS for a variety of values 
of the constant associated with DUM^.i. The final estimates of 
Ti, Tj, and T3 will be taken to be those corresponding to the 
value of T that minimizes the 2SLS objective function for the 
estimated supply relation. The estimates of Tj, Tj, and T3 
will enable tests of hypotheses concerning the effects of the 
anticipated and unanticipated positions of demand on the 
degree of oligopoly coordination. 
As was true in Baker's analysis, though, it is impossible 
to uniquely infer values of Po and Tq from the estimates of tïq 
and Ô. That is, Po and Tq are not econometrically identified 
and, as a result, marginal cost and 6^ are not identified. An 
alternative model, however, based on more restrictive assump­
tions regarding functional forms, does enable estimation of 
marginal cost and the degree of market power. Specifically, 
identification is possible if marginal cost is assumed to be 
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independent of firm output and both demand and marginal cost 
are linear functions of their determinants: 
Qt **0 ^k^kt 
Pt\ + e, (4.16) 
and 
MC{W,) = Po + PiP/it + + + ;4.i7) 
where the anticipated demand position is given by: 
0)(. CCg + ^ ^k^kt' (4.18, 
while denotes the unanticipated portion of the demand 
position. Profit maximization then implies: 
4 • i) • MCiWf.) , ( 4 . 1 9 )  
where Ô equals [ (a,.,i/ZJ (P^/Qt) ] . 
As above, suppose 0^ is a function of the anticipated and 
unanticipated portions of the demand position, such that: 
0t = to + + 1:2 - ûfc) + (4.20) 
where DUM^.i, which captures the effects of significantly 
negative shocks to demand, is as defined before, and the 
estimate of the anticipated portion of demand is given by the 
following: 
Û>f. &Q + ^ ^ 2^2t ^k^kt' ( 4 . 2 1 )  
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Equations (4.17), (4.19), and (4.20) imply: 
•Pfc ~ Po ^2^Zt "^oOt^t 
+ + ;t2 (^c+1 - ^t)Qt^t + + ^t' (4.22) 
where equals -Ti/«k+i (1=0,1,2,3). Estimation of equations 
(4.16) and (4.22), using the procedure outlined for the log-
linear case, allows identification of all of the T^'s and of 0^ 
as well. One potential problem with models in which 0^ is 
identified, however, is that it is quite possible for 
estimates of 0t to lie outside the "rational" bounds of zero 
and one. A solution suggested by Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 
is to impose a logistic specification on 0^. That is, assume 
0t is given by: 
0 _ EXP{Xq + + '^2 ~ 22) 
^ 1 + EXP{Xq + + t2(ût+i - aj + ' 
which constrains 0t to lie in the zero-one interval. The 
supply relationship for the linear version of the model then 
becomes : 
ft = Po + Pif^it + P2^2t + + Pm%,e - ( 4 . 2 4 )  
where 0^ corresponds to equation (4.23). The model to be 
estimated then consists of equations (4.16) and (4.24), where 
equation (4.24) can be estimated via nonlinear 2SLS. 
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I estimate all three of the above versions of the model 
using data from the rayon industry of the 1930s in hopes of 
answering some of the questions concerning the role of demand 
movements. Before proceeding to empirical results, however, I 
discuss in the next chapter the relevance of the rayon 
industry to the issue at hand and the nature of the data to be 
used. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE RAYON INDUSTRY OF THE 1930S 
The theoretical predictions concerning anticipated and 
unanticipated demand movements will be assessed by applying 
the three versions of the empirical model discussed in the 
previous chapter to data from the rayon industry of the 1930s. 
This chapter discusses the structure of the rayon industry 
during this period and presents the data I use in the 
empirical application. 
The Rayon Industry 
The rayon industry, characterized by a small number of 
firms producing a relatively homogeneous product, was 
decidedly oligopolistic throughout the 1930s. Moreover, as 
discussed by Markham (1952) and Scherer and Ross (1990), it is 
likely that cooperation existed periodically among firms in 
the industry. For example, attempting to control excessive 
chiselling on list prices during the early 1930s, several of 
the larger producers entered explicit price fixing agreements, 
which were eventually ordered to cease by the Federal Trade 
Commission in 1937. 
Other evidence, although circumstantial, shows that 
conditions during the 1930s were ripe for some degree of 
coordination to exist in the industry. First, the top four 
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firms controlled over seventy percent of the output in the 
industry, suggesting quite high concentration ratios. Second, 
no other synthetic fibers posed any significant threat to 
rayon's position in the U.S. fiber market, although compe­
tition between natural fibers (namely silk) and rayon was 
brisk at times. Third, many of the producers in the industry 
were originally subsidiaries of European companies, who 
associated with each other through European cartels.And 
fourth, the entry of new firms was virtually nonexistent 
during this period, effectively eliminating any potentially 
disruptive influences on the structure of the industry. This 
evidence, coupled with the price agreements mentioned above, 
shows that significant cooperation may have occurred among 
producers in the rayon industry throughout the 1930s. 
During the periods when explicit cooperation appeared to 
be lacking, though, price leadership on the part of the 
largest producer, American Viscose Corporation, created 
discipline in the industry to the extent that smaller firms 
generally followed the pricing practices of American Viscose. 
This is supported by testimony from the FTC hearings of the 
1930s. For example, when summoned before the Federal Trade 
Commission to testify on pricing practices in the rayon 
industry, the spokesmen for all the small- and medium-size 
^®Jesse Markham, Competition in the Rayon Industry 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 3. 
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producers stated that they set their list prices to correspond 
with those of the larger producers, particularly the list 
prices of American Viscose. 
Evidence also indicates that the business cycle likely 
had a strong effect on the behavior of rayon producers 
throughout the 1930s. In particular, many statements from the 
representatives of various rayon producers of the time suggest 
that coordination was weakened during periods of slack demand. 
For example, Mr. Bassill, president of Tubize Corporation 
said, "It generally happens in this business that there are 
certain times .... when the demand is not so great and there 
are large stocks on hand (that) some of the smaller producers, 
ourselves included, must of necessity be a little under the 
price of (American) Viscose and Du Pont in order to move our 
product in certain fields.""' And further, Mr. Scott, vice 
president of Tubize Corporation reportedly said, "No rayon 
association could ever survive a protracted period of slack 
demand. It is almost impossible to get together men to 
consider seriously the statistics of our industry without 
injecting into the discussions transactions by one and the 
other which bring on accusations of unfair business dealings. 
A man always thinks it is unfair for his competitors to sell 
'"ibid, p. 72. 
i®ibid, p. 75. 
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goods below him. And the time of these meetings is usually 
taken up by that sort of thing. Nothing constructive ever 
came out of any of them, and I think I know as much about them 
as anyone."" These statements imply that cooperation was most 
likely to breakdown during recessionary periods. 
The discussion above suggests that, throughout the 1930s, 
rayon producers may have engaged in a relatively high degree 
of coordination, facilitated by price leadership, and that 
periods of more-competitive behavior may have occurred in 
response to fluctuations in demand.^" It also appears due to 
the storability of rayon that inventories were of strategic 
importance to firms in the industry. In particular, short-
term fluctuations in demand were regularly absorbed through 
inventory variations and not production adjustments or price 
"ibid, p.77. 
^°As in Porter's study of the JEC, price, rather than 
quantity, seems to have been the decision variable of rayon 
producers. Consequently, in evaluating the effects of unanti­
cipated demand movements, it is more appropriate to think in 
terms of Porter's "trigger-output" argument; in which the 
industry price leader sets the price, and cheating takes the 
form of secret price cutting. Significant price cutting is 
then inferred from any excessive reduction in the price 
leader's sales (beyond that associated with "normal" 
fluctuations of demand), which then trigger a finite period of 
more-competitive behavior. In equilibrium, though, these 
periods of increased competition will only follow signifi­
cantly negative unanticipated shifts of demand. 
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changes.In the next chapter, I test for the effects of 
anticipated and unanticipated demand movements on the degree 
of oligopoly coordination. Price leadership and the 
production-smoothing role of inventories will be investigated 
in greater detail in Chapter 8, using a stock-adjustment model 
of inventories. Before I can estimate any models, however, an 
adequate data set is needed. Consequently, the next section 
discusses the data set to be used. 
Data 
Inasmuch as firms in the rayon industry during the 1930s 
probably responded to market conditions on a month-to-month 
basis, monthly data seems the most appropriate. Due to data 
limitations, however, the sample period I have selected is 
from October 1932 to June 1940. 
Rayon output and price data were obtained from Rayon 
Orqanon, the principle trade publication at the time. Since 
rayon was produced by the viscose and acetate processes, the 
sum of viscose and acetate yarn shipments comprises the 
measure of market output.^ Rayon price, on the other hand. 
^^F.M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure 
and Economic Performance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1990), p. 272. 
^Both types of yarn were close substitutes in 
consumption, and as such, their sum provides an adequate 
measure of total rayon output. 
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was constructed as a quantity-weighted average of the viscose 
and acetate prices of the designated price leader. Markham 
noted that, since price leadership was very strong throughout 
the 1930s, it was customary of researchers to infer the market 
price of rayon from the price leader's quoted price. 
In the demand equations from Chapter 4, rayon demand is 
assumed to depend upon the real price of rayon and the anti­
cipated position of demand (based on information available 
from the previous period). Accordingly, a few more variables 
need to be introduced. First, I divide nominal prices by the 
wholesale price index to convert them to real terms. Second, 
I propose that substitute prices, the general "health" of the 
economy, and a time trend are all good predictors of future 
demand. The anticipated demand position in period t is 
therefore assumed to depend upon the period t-1 real silk 
price, the period t-1 real industrial production index (or, 
depending on the specification, the real textile production 
index), and a simple time trend (beginning with one in October 
1932). The silk price, industrial production index, and 
textile production index data were collected from the Survey 
of Current Business. 
The two primary inputs used in the production of rayon 
during the 1930s were labor and cellulose. To capture the 
influence of their prices on marginal cost, I use data on the 
nominal rayon wage and the price of wood pulp obtained from 
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the Monthly Labor Review and the Survey of Current Business, 
respectively. As with demand, I also include a time trend in 
marginal cost. 
In preparation for Chapter 8's analysis, I also collected 
data on monthly rayon production and inventories from Rayon 
Organon. This data, in combination with the rayon shipments 
data, will be used to test for production-smoothing. Before 
proceeding to this analysis, however, the next chapter 
discusses the results obtained from the estimation of the 
models in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter summarizes the results obtained from 
estimating the three versions of the model presented in 
Chapter 4. In particular, applying the rayon industry data 
from Chapter 5 to the log-linear, linear (with linear 0), and 
linear (with logistic 0) versions of the model, my results run 
counter to those predicted by Green and Porter, Rotemberg and 
Saloner, and Haltiwanger and Harrington. Although the results 
fail to support any of these three theories, there does exist 
a theoretical base from which the results can be explained. 
The results for each of the versions are discussed in the 
three sections that follow. The concluding section of the 
chapter interprets the findings and suggests a plausible 
reason for the results. 
Log-Linear/Linear 0 Version 
The log-linear version of the model corresponds to 
equations (4.9) and (4.15) from Chapter 4. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, one weakness of this version is that the oligopoly 
conduct parameter 0 is not identified. The objective of the 
analysis, to test for the effects of anticipated and unanti­
cipated demand movements, can be accomplished, however, by 
testing the significance of parameters that are identified. 
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In preparation for the discussion of the empirical results, 
key variables are defined in Table 2. 
Using the variables defined in Table 2, 0 and the log of 
marginal cost are given by: 
Table 2. Variable names and definitions for the log-linear/ 
linear 0 version 
Variable Name Definition 
LQ Log of current rayon output 
LRP Log of current real rayon price 
C Constant 
LRSP(-l) Log of one-period lagged real silk price 
LRTP(-l) Log of one-period lagged real textile 
production index 
TIME Number of months since October 1932 
LANQ(l) Log of estimate of one-period ahead anticipated 
demand position 
CHLANQ( 1) Log of change in estimated anticipated demand 
position between one-period ahead and 
current period 
DUM(-l) Dummy variable equal to one when demand 
residual is significantly negative in the 
previous period 
T Constant used in the construction of DUM(-l) 
LP Log of current nominal rayon price 
LWG Log of current nominal rayon industry labor 
wage 
LWP Log of current nominal wood pulp price 
LMC Log of current marginal cost 
e(-l) One-period lagged demand error 
v(-l) One-period lagged supply error 
Pd Demand error autocorrelation coefficient 
Ps Supply error autocorrelation coefficient 
DW Durbin-Watson test statistic 
OBJ Value of 2SLS objective function corresponding 
to estimated supply relationship 
N Sample size 
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0  =  T o  +  X^LANQ{1) + x^CHLANQil) + X.^DUM{-1) , ( 6 . 1 )  
and 
LMC = Po + PiLO + Pgl-f/G + ^ jLWP + P^TJME + V. ( 6 . 2 )  
The demand and supply equations, ( 4 . 9 )  and ( 4 . 1 5 )  respec­
tively, become: 
L£) = «0 + a^LRSP{-l) + azLRTPi-l) + a^TlME + àLRP +  e ,  ( 6 . 3 )  
and 
LP = + PiZ,g + PzZ/P/G + ^jLWP + p^rJMff 
+ n^LANQil) + n^'^HLANQil) + li^DUM{-l) + v, ( 6 . 4 )  
where tIq equals Po - Tq/ô, tCi  equals -Tj/ô, equals -t^/ô, and 
ÎÏ3 equals -T3/Ô. 
The Durbin-Watson test rejected the null hypothesis of no 
first-order autocorrelation of the demand and supply errors. 
Consequently, e and v are assumed to behave according to: 
e = PjE (-1)  + n,  
V  =  PgV(-l) +  w ,  
where ]! and w are the iid components of the demand and supply 
errors, respectively. Therefore, given the above demand error 
specification, that portion of current demand which is unanti­
cipated corresponds to the iid component n; whereas the anti­
cipated position of current demand and the change in that 
position are given by: 
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LANQ = #0 + â^LRSP{-l) + â^^RTPi-l) + â^TIME + p^{-l) (6.5) 
and 
CHLANQ = LANQ - LANQ ( -1 ) . (6.6) 
Equations (6.3) and (6.4), after correcting for autocor-
related errors, were estimated using the procedure outlined in 
Chapter 4. Correcting each equation for autocorrelated errors 
involved first-differencing each equation and then jointly 
estimating, by nonlinear 2SLS, the respective parameters of 
each equation, along with the corresponding autocorrelation 
coefficient. First, following the procedure discussed in 
Chapter 4, the first-differenced version of equation (6.3) was 
estimated by nonlinear 2SLS, where the results were used to 
construct LANQ(l), CHLANQ(1), and DUM(-l). Next, these three 
variables were substituted into the supply relationship (6.4). 
The first-differenced supply relationship was then estimated 
by nonlinear 2SLS in an iterative manner, with the iterations 
corresponding to different values of the constant term T in 
the construction of DUM(-l). The reported estimates of the 
supply equation (6.4) are those associated with the value of T 
which minimizes the 2SLS objective function for the estimated 
equation (6.4). This procedure identifies those significant 
unanticipated demand reductions that are most likely to 
56 
trigger shifts in conduct." The results from the estimation 
of equations (6.3) and (6.4) are presented in Table 3.^^ 
The estimated demand equation contains several interes­
ting results. First, the estimated price elasticity of rayon 
is significantly less than negative one throughout the sample 
period, which is supported by most textile research of the 
time." Moreover, assuming 0 lies between zero and one, this 
estimate of the price elasticity lends support to the needed 
approximation of In (1 + 0/Ô) by 0/Ô. Second, the real silk 
price has a significantly positive effect on the anticipated 
demand for rayon. This is expected, since silk was a close 
substitute for rayon during this period. Third, the negative 
effect of textile production on rayon demand is troubling, 
though the effect is insignificant. And finally, the coef-
used the Time Series Processor (TSP) computer package 
to estimate equations (6.3) and (6.4). Since TSP uses a 
weighted standard error of regression as the objective func­
tion when running nonlinear 2SLS, this is the value of the 
objective function I report. 
^''Since the procedure uses nonlinear 2SLS, a set of 
instruments is needed. In the case of equation (6.3), the set 
of instruments includes the log of the lagged real silk price, 
the log of the lagged real textile production index, the log 
of the current real rayon wage, the log of the current real 
wood pulp price, and the time trend. In the case of equation 
(6.4), the set of instruments includes the log of the lagged 
nominal silk price, the log of the lagged nominal textile 
production index, the log of the current nominal rayon wage, 
the log of the current nominal wood pulp price, the time 
trend, LANQ(l), DUM(-l), and CHLANQ(1). 
"Jesse Markham, Competition in the Rayon Industry 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 39. 
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Table 3. Results from the estimation of the log-linear/linear 
0 version 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
Demand Parameters: 
tto -11.167* -1.924 
t t i  1 . 0 4 3 * * *  2.984 
«2 -0.183 -0.639 
a, -0.013 -1.635 
Ô  - 3 . 8 6 4 * * *  -2.798 
p d  0 . 7 5 2 * * *  10.828 
R" = .697 
DW = .808 
N = 90  
Supply Parameters: 
îto 
Pi 
P2 
P3 
p. 
îtl 
ÏÏ2 
Ttj 
P| 
R^ = .954 
DW = .540 
N = 86 
T = 1.67 
OBJ = .012 
3 . 6 7 2 * * *  
0 . 1 2 3 * * *  
0.286** 
0.069 
002** 
228*** 
0 4 9 * * *  
019** 
888*** 
• 0 ,  
0 
•0 
0 
0 
6 . 0 4 1  
- 3 . 2 3 9  
2.591 
1.423 
- 2 . 2 0 9  
6.888 
-3.254 
2.131 
13.114 
*Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level. 
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ficient of the time trend is insignificant, suggesting that 
there was little discernable trend in the demand for rayon 
throughout the 1930s. 
Using the results from the demand specification, the 
supply equation was estimated for several values of the 
constant T (used in the construction of DUM(-l)). As indi­
cated in Table 3, the "best" T is equal to 1.67, which yields 
a minimum of .012 for the nonlinear 2SLS objective function 
corresponding to the estimated supply equation. This value of 
T causes DUM(-l) to equal one in approximately 8% of the 
sample period, which suggests that significant negative shocks 
to rayon demand were rare throughout the 1930s. 
Table 3 also indicates that most of the estimates from 
the supply equation are significant. As expected, the 
coefficients of the rayon wage and the wood pulp price are 
positive, although the influence of the wood pulp price is 
insignificant. Also, since the coefficient of the time trend 
is significantly negative, marginal cost tends to fall over 
time; which is easily reconciled with the interpretation of 
time as a proxy for technological progress. The significantly 
negative effect of output on marginal cost is troubling, 
however, because it suggests that the results may be 
inconsistent with the second-order condition for profit 
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maximization." Nonetheless, the contribution of output to 
explanatory power suggests that it should be included in 
supply. 
Table 3 also indicates that -K I and (the coefficients of 
IiANQ(l) and DUM(-l), respectively) are significantly positive, 
whereas (the coefficient of CHLANQ(l)) is significantly 
negative. These results, however, are counter to those 
predicted by Rotemberg and Saloner, Haltiwanger and 
Harrington, and Green and Porter. In particular, since 
Rotemberg and Saloner predict coordination will fall during 
periods of high demand, this would be supported by a negative 
value for Ti in equation (6.1) and therefore a negative value 
for ÏÏ1 in equation (6.4). On the other hand, Haltiwanger and 
Harrington predict that coordination will fall during periods 
of falling anticipated demand, which would be supported by a 
positive value for T; in equation (6.1) and therefore a 
positive value for ji, in equation (6.4). And finally. Green 
and Porter's prediction that the degree of coordination will 
be lower following any significantly large reductions in 
^®The second-order condition for firm i's profit maximi­
zation is dMR/dqj < dMC/dq^, or 
i'M' ^ I) < p."' 
Naturally, this condition would be automatically satisfied for 
all 0 in (0,1) if Ô < -1 and Pi > 0. Because Tq and Po are not 
identified (and, therefore, 0 and MC are not identified) in 
this model, the condition cannot be checked. 
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unanticipated demand would be supported by negative values for 
T3 and JI3. 
Whether or not the effects of LANQ(l), CHLANQ(l), and 
DUM(-l) on 6 are significant must still be addressed. Since 
the estimates of the Tj's from equation (6.1) must be inferred 
from the estimated îi^'s and Ô from the supply and demand 
equations, respectively, the standard errors corresponding to 
each of the î^'s must also be inferred.Because the Tt^'s and 
Ô were not estimated jointly but rather in separate stages of 
a 2-stage estimation technique, the method produced no 
estimates of covariances among the ft/s and 6. However, if ft^ 
and 6 are assumed to be independent, the variance of can be 
approximated by the following expression:^" 
var(fj) = t^variH^) +iilvar{B) 2=1,2,3. (6.7) 
Using the estimated supply and demand coefficients and their 
standard errors from Table 3, along with the approximation 
(6.7), the estimated t's and their corresponding t-statistics 
are given in Table 4. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that all three variables 
likely affected 0 significantly throughout the 1930s, 
although the level of significance of the estimated coef-
^''That is, Ti equals (i=l,2,3). Recall, T q  cannot 
uniquely be inferred. 
^See William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), p. 77. 
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Table 4. Estimated coefficients and t-statistics corres­
ponding to linear specification of 0 in the 
log-linear version 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
To not identified 
0.879** 2.592 
X2 -0.188** -2.121 
T3 0.072* 1.695 
^Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
ficient of DUM(-l) is only 10%. As just mentioned, though, 
these estimates do not conform to the predictions of the three 
anticipated/unanticipated demand models. There is an alter­
native explanation for these results, however, which has a 
plausible "theoretical" basis. I will postpone discussion of 
this explanation until the last section of this chapter. 
Linear/Linear 0 version 
In response to the inability of the log-linear/linear 0 
version of the model to identify 0, Chapter 4 proposed the 
solution of assuming demand and marginal cost to be linear and 
marginal cost to be independent of output. This, in conjunc­
tion with a linear specification for 0, led to the demand and 
supply equations (4.16) and (4.22), respectively. Although 0 
is identified in this version of the model, it will be seen in 
this section that it is quite possible for the estimated 0 to 
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lie outside the "rational" zero-one bounds. One solution to 
this problem, as will be discussed in the next section of this 
chapter, is to assume a logistic specification for 0. As 
such, 6 is restricted to lie between zero and one. I begin by 
defining the key variables in Table 5. 
Using the variables defined in Table 5, 0 is given by: 
0 = Xq + x^ANQil) + X^CHANQil) + X^DUM{-1) . (6.8) 
Firms are assumed to face a linear market demand and marginal 
cost, such that the market demand (4.16) and industry supply 
relationship (4.22) become: 
TOTQ = tto + a^RSIPi-l) + a2RXPD{-l) + a^TIME 
+ a^RRAYP + € (6.9) 
and 
RAYP = Po + PiM? + + ^^TIME + % QTOTO»Z + Tt^ANQ{l) •TOTQ'Z 
+ t z^ ' ^HANQU) •TOTQ'Z + •K^DUM{-1)»T0TQ»Z + V ,  (6.10) 
where equals -Ti/a^ (1=0,1,2,3). Therefore, 0 can be 
identified because the n^'s and are individually identified 
in the estimation of equations (6.9) and (6.10). 
As with the log-linear version of the model, the Durbin-
Watson statistic rejected the null hypothesis of no autocor­
relation for the demand and supply errors. Consequently, the 
unanticipated demand position is captured by the iid component 
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Table 5. Variable names and definitions for the linear/linear 
0 version 
Variable Name Definition 
TOTQ Current rayon output 
RRAYP Current real rayon price 
C Constant 
RSIP(-l) One-period lagged real silk price 
RIPD(-l) One-period lagged real industrial 
production index 
TIME Number of months since October 1932 
ANQ(l) Estimate of one-period ahead anticipated 
demand position 
CHANQ(1 ) Change in estimated anticipated demand 
position between one-period ahead and 
current period 
DUM(-l) Dummy variable equal to one when 
demand residual is significantly 
negative in the previous period 
T Constant used in the construction of DUM(-l) 
RAYP Current nominal rayon price 
WG Current nominal rayon industry labor wage 
WP Current nominal wood pulp price 
Z Current wholesale price index, used to create 
real variables 
MC Current marginal cost 
e (-1) One-period lagged demand error 
v(-l) One-period lagged supply error 
Pd Demand error autocorrelation coefficient 
Ps Supply error autocorrelation coefficient 
DW Durbin-Watson test statistic 
OBJ Value of 2SLS objective function corresponding 
to estimated supply relationship 
N Sample size 
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of the demand error, whereas the anticipated position of 
demand and the change in that position between the current and 
previous period are given by: 
ANQ = #0 + &^RSIP{-1) + â^RIPDi-l) + â^TIME + p^(-l), (6.11) 
and 
CHANQ = ANQ - ANQ ( -1 ) . (6.12) 
Correcting the AR(1) demand and supply errors by first-
differencing each equation, equations (6.9) and (6.10) were 
estimated using the procedure outlined in the previous 
section.The results are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6 shows results that are very similar to those 
obtained from the log-linear/linear 0 version. For example, 
as indicated in Table 6, the real silk price from the linear 
demand specification had a significantly positive effect on 
the demand for rayon. Also, the coefficient of the real rayon 
price is significantly negative, suggesting a downward sloping 
demand for rayon. And further, similar to the log-linear 
version, the negative coefficient of real industrial produc­
tion is disturbing (although it is insignificant), since one 
^^The set of instruments used to estimate demand consist 
of the lagged real silk price, lagged real industrial pro­
duction, the real rayon wage, the real wood pulp price, and 
the time trend. The set of instruments used to estimate 
supply consist of the lagged nominal silk price, lagged 
nominal industrial production, the nominal rayon wage, the 
nominal wood pulp price, the time trend, ANQ(1), CHANQ(1), and 
DUM(-l) . 
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would expect industrial production to have a positive effect 
on the demand for rayon. Finally, the results from Table 5 
indicate that the time trend associated with the demand 
equation is insignificantly negative. 
Table 6. Results from the estimation of the linear/linear 0 
version 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
Demand Parameters : 
0 ^  8 1 . 2 0 7 * *  2 . 2 9 2  
6 2 6 . 8 8 4 * *  2.484 
«2 -12.404 -1.355 
«3 -0.039 -0.229 
a ,  - 7 2 7 4 . 8 9 0 *  -1.854 
p d  0 . 8 0 8 * * *  12.995 
R" = .769 
DW = .596 
N = 90 
Supply Parameters: 
0.446*** 5.643 
0 . 4 1 8 * *  2 . 3 3 0  
0 . 0 2 7 * *  2 . 3 1 2  
- 0 . 0 0 3 * * *  - 4 . 9 7 4  
- 0 . 0 0 0 2 * * *  - 2 . 6 2 9  
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 * * *  3 . 2 3 0  
-0.0000006* - 1 . 9 2 8  
0.00001* 1.807 
0 . 7 2 9 * * *  8 . 8 9 3  
R^ = .909 
DW = .455 
N = 86 
T = 1.49 
OBJ = .008 
*Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level. 
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Among the numerous supply equation regressions, Table 6 
shows that the one which minimized the value of the nonlinear 
2SLS objective function (OBJ = .008) for the estimated supply 
equation led the constant T to equal 1.49. This value of T 
caused DUM(-l) to equal 1 in less than 6% of the sample, again 
suggesting that significant unanticipated demand reductions 
were rare throughout the 1930s. 
Table 6 also indicates that all of the supply coef­
ficients are significantly different from zero (at various 
levels of significance). In particular, the coefficients of 
both input prices are positive, whereas the coefficient of the 
time trend is negative. Moreover, the estimated tïj's are all 
of the same sign as those from the log-linear version. As for 
the estimated Ti's, we know that equals (i=0,l,2,3). 
Using this equality, along with the variance approximation 
counterpart to (6.7), the inferred estimated t^'s and their t-
statistics are given in Table 7.'° 
The results from Table 7 show that all of the estimated 
Ti's are of the same sign as those reported in the log-linear 
version. Unlike the log-linear results, however, none of the 
estimated t/s are significant in this version. Consequently, 
at a minimum, all that can be said is that the results fail to 
support any of the three tested theoretical models. 
^The coefficient replaces Ô in equation (6.7). 
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Table 7. Estimated coefficients and t-statistics 
corresponding to the linear specification of 0 in 
the linear/linear 0 version 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
To -1.322 -1.515 
T i  0 . 0 1 6  1 . 6 0 8  
T2 -0.004 -1.337 
T3 0.085 1.294 
Using the parameter estimates from Table 7, the estimated 
values of 0^ are computed by inserting the ti's into equation 
(6.8) along with the values of right-hand side variables for 
any t. The standard errors of 6^, on the other hand, must be 
estimated from the results presented in Table 6. In parti­
cular, assuming (i=0,l,2,3) and are independent, a 
counterpart to equation (6.7) approximates the variance of 
(TJ , while the covariance between and tj becomes: 
cov(fj,îj.) = &lcov{itftj) + a^^iijVarici^) (6.13) 
Defining as the row vector [1 ANQ(1 ) ^ CHANQ(1) ^ DUM(-1)J, 
the standard error of 6t is then given by: 
s.e. [6(.] = [Mj-SATt] (6.14) 
where S is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the 
parameter estimates to, Tj, t;, and t,. The estimates of 0%, 
along with their t-statistics, are reported in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Estimates of 0 from the linear/linear 0 version® 
Year 
Month 1933 1934 1935 1936 
January .06 (0 .58) -.02 (-0. 16) -.09 (-0 .62) 
February .03 (0 .24) -.10 (-0. 69) -.10 (-0 .67) 
March .01 (0. 03) -.03 (-0 .23) -.10 (-0. 53) -.12 (-0 .76) 
April .15 (0. 97) -.10 (-0 .69) -.23 (-1. 07) -.13 (-0 .79) 
May .17 (1. 30) -.15 (-0 .87) -.18 (-0. 96) -.14 (-0 .81) 
June .25 (1. 57) -.16 (-0 .90) -.17 (-0. 93) -.06 (-0 .46) 
July .23 (1. 64) -.15 (-0 .86) — .11 (-0. 69) .01 (0 .08) 
August .17 (1. 45) -.16 (-0 .89) -.03 (-0. 22) .03 (0 .26) 
September .15 (1. 30) -.18 (-0 .97) -.03 (-0. 22) -.03 (-0 .23) 
October .11 (1. 03) -.11 (-0 .72) -.05 (-0. 39) -.04 (-0 .30) 
November .07 (0. 68) -.09 (-0 .62) -.10 (-0. 67) -.04 (-0 .34) 
December . 05 (0. 48) -.05 (-0 .40) -.11 (-0. 69) -.04 (-0 .31) 
Year 
Month 1937 1938 1939 1940 
January -.05 (-0. 38) -.23 (-1 .08) -.03 (-0 .26) .08 (0. 81) 
February -.08 (-0. 60) -.21 (-1 .02) -.03 (-0 .25) .00 (0. 00) 
March -.08 (-0. 55) -.17 (-0 .94) -.03 (-0 .26) -.01 (-0. 08) 
April — .05 (-0. 38) -.18 (-0 .96) -.04 (-0 .35) -.01 (-0. 10) 
May -.05 (-0. 41) -.22 (-1 .05) -.02 (-0 .13) .04 (0. 37) 
June -.04 (-0. 32) -.22 (-1 .05) .02 (0 .20) 
July -.03 (-0. 27) -.05 (-0 .33) .06 (0 .57) 
August -.04 (-0. 35) .04 (0 .36) .07 (0 .69) 
September -.09 (-0. 65) .02 (0 .21) .09 (0 .82) 
October -.17 (-0. 93) -.06 (-0 .44) .10 (0 .94) 
November -.21 (-1. 03) -.03 (-0 .21) .09 (0 .94) 
December -.21 (-1. 03) -.08 (-0 .54) .12 (1 .05) 
*t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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As the results in Table 8 show, however, none of 
the estimated O^'s are significantly different from zero. 
This can also be seen from the 95% confidence intervals for 
the estimated 0t's, given by: 
Q f .  ±  1 . 9 8 7 * 8 .  e .  [ 6 t ]  •  ( 6 . 1 5 )  
Figure 1 shows that 0t = 0 lies between the upper and lower 
confidence bounds for all time periods, and, therefore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of perfectly competitive 
behavior (i.e., 0t equals zero for all time periods). 
Thus, the results from the linear/linear 0 version fail 
to support any of the tested theories. Moreover, although 
insignificant, the estimates of 0 often lie outside the zero-
one bounds." In response to this, the next section of the 
chapter assumes 0 is a logistic function of the anticipated 
and unanticipated components of demand. 
Linear/Logistic 0 version 
The benefit of specifying the conjectural elasticity as a 
logistic function of anticipated and unanticipated demand is 
that the conjectural elasticity is restricted to lie in the 
"Although profit maximization requires that 0 lie in the 
zero-one interval, there are conditions under which negative 0 
values can make sense. If firms practice predatory pricing, 
for example, driving price below marginal cost, 0 would then 
become negative. However, although entry and exit were quite 
limited in the 1930s rayon industry, evidence suggesting that 
rayon producers engaged in predatory pricing is lacking. 
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zero-one interval. Accordingly, the logistic specification of 
0 is given by: 
EXP{t:Q + t:^ANQ{1) + x^CHANQil) +X^DUM{-1)) 
1 + EXP{ X Q +  X ^ANQil) + X ^CHANQH) + X ^ D U M { - 1 ) )  
This leads to the following specification of supply: 
RAYP = Po + PiPl^G + PzP/f + P3TJME - (6.17) 
«4 
where 0 corresponds to equation (6.16). Using.the procedure 
outlined in the previous section, in which the anticipated 
position of demand and the change in that position are given 
by equations (6.11) and (6.12), respectively, the demand 
equation (6.9) and the supply relationship (6.17) were 
estimated by nonlinear 2SLS. That is, since the Durbin-Watson 
statistic rejected the null hypothesis of no first-order 
autocorrelation in the errors, equations (6.9) and (6.17) were 
first-differenced and estimated separately, generating 
parameter estimates (along with the estimated autocorrelation 
coefficients). Moreover, since the only difference between 
this version of the model and the linear/linear 0 version of 
the model is in the specification of 0, the same set of 
instruments used to estimate the linear/linear 0 version were 
used in this version of the model. The results are reported 
in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Results from the estimation of the linear/logistic 0 
version 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
Demand Parameters : 
^ 81.207** 2.292 
tti 626.884** 2.484 
«2 -12.404 -1.355 
«3 -0.039 -0.229 
-7274.890* -1.854 
Pd 0.808*** 12.995 
R2 = .769 
DW = .596 
N = 90 
Supply Parameters: 
Po 0.415*** 4.845 
Pi 0.431** 2.197 
Pz 0.023* 1.752 
Ps -0.003*** -4.912 
To -6.864 -1.213 
Ti 0.064 1.044 
T2 -0.035 -1.349 
T3 1.032* 1.831 
R" = .893 
DW = .592 
N = 86 
T = 1.51 
OBJ = .009 
^Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level. 
Since the same demand specification estimated in the last 
section was estimated in this section, the demand estimates 
reported in Table 9 are exactly the same as those reported in 
Table 6. As for supply, the results are very similar to those 
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reported in Table 6. The value of the constant T, which 
minimized the weighted standard error of the estimated supply 
(i.e., OBJ=.009), equals 1.51. This triggered a value of one 
for DUM(-l) in slightly less than 5% of the sample period. As 
for the parameter estimates, all of the marginal cost coeffi­
cients are significantly different from zero (although at 
varying degrees of significance) and quite close to their 
counterparts obtained from the linear/linear 0 version of the 
model. Unlike the previous section, however, the nonlinear 
estimation of equation (6.17) allows the parameters of 0 to be 
directly estimated; and as indicated in Table 9, the only 
variable to significantly affect 0 (at the 10% level of 
significance) was DUM(-l). Yet, similar to the last section, 
the estimated ti's are all of the opposite signs as those 
predicted by the three theories. 
Using the estimated Tj's  from Table 9, the estimates of 0 
are computed. The standard error of 6^ (used to construct 
t-statistics) is approximated by the following expression: 
s.e. [0^] = [Z,llz',] -5, (6.18) 
where is the gradient vector of the function in equation 
(6.16), with respect to the t^'s, evaluated at period t values 
of the right-hand side variables, and S is the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix of the estimated t^'s (which is 
easily available from TSP output). Table 10 provides the 
estimates of 0, along with their appropriate t-statistics. 
As indicated in Table 10, there were many months throughout 
the 1930s when 6^ was significantly different from zero. In 
particular, at the 5% level of significance, 0^ was signi-
Table 10. Estimates of 0 from the linear/logistic 0 version^ 
Year 
Month 1933 1934 1935 1936 
January .19 (2 .35) .15 (1 .48) .12 (1 .08) 
February .18 (1 .91) .13 (1 .06) .12 (1 .05) 
March .18 (1 .71) .15 (1 .44) .22 (1 .21) .11 (0 .98) 
April .37 (3 .50) .12 (1 .05) .08 (0 .70) .10 (0 .94) 
May .25 (4 .28) .10 (0 .88) .08 (0 .78) .10 (0 .92) 
June .32 (3 .62) .09 (0 .85) .09 (0 .83) .12 (1 .17) 
July .34 (3 .81) .10 (0 .88) .10 (0 .99) .16 (1 .69) 
August .29 (4 .23) .10 (0 .86) .14 (1 .34) .18 (1 .92) 
September .26 (4 .17) .09 (0 .79) .15 (1 .45) .16 (1 .45) 
October .24 (3 .18) .10 (0 .96) .14 (1 .29) .14 (1 .35) 
November .21 (2 .52) .12 (1 .09) .12 (1 .06) .14 (1 .33) 
December .19 (2 .21) .13 (1 .25) .11 (1 .02) .14 (1 .34) 
Year 
Month 1937 1938 1939 1940 
January .14 (1 .30) .07 (0 .69) .14 (1 .38) .22 (2 .73) 
February .13 (1 .13) .08 (0 .73) .15 (1 .40) .18 (1 .67) 
March .12 (1 .14) .09 (0 .81) .14 (1 .39) .15 (1 .55) 
April .13 (1 .28) .09 (0 .80) .14 (1 .33) .16 (1 .55) 
May .14 (1 .27) .08 (0 .72) .15 (1 .49) .17 (2 .01) 
June .14 (1 .33) .07 (0 .71) .17 (1 .83) 
July .14 (1 .39) .11 (1 .18) .19 (2 .33) 
August .14 (1 .33) .18 (2 .02) .20 (2 .54) 
September .12 (1 .08) .18 (1 .88) .21 (2 .81) 
October .10 (0 .84) .15 (1 .27) .22 (3 .09) 
November .08 (0 .74) .11 (0 .98) .22 (3 .07) 
December .08 (0 .73) .12 (1 .12) .23 (3 .41) 
""t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
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ficant from zero for the following time periods: April 1933 to 
January 1934, August 1938, July 1939 to January 1940, and May 
1940. Using equation (6.15), the 95% confidence intervals for 
the estimated G^'s are given in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows that one problem with the use of equation 
(6.15) to generate the confidence interval for the logistic 0 
is that the upper and lower bounds may be outside the zero-one 
interval. However, if 0 is restricted to lie in the zero-one 
interval, then the upper and lower confidence bounds should 
also be restricted to this interval. 
One technique that can be used to restrict the upper and 
lower confidence bounds to the zero-one interval ivolves the 
following steps. First, using the estimates of Tq, Ti, t-, and 
T3 from Table 9, along with the variance-covariance matrix of 
the estimated T'S, the upper and lower confidence bounds, 
denoted f^ and fi, are created for the linear approximation of 
0 using the techniques described in the previous section. 
Second, given these upper and lower bounds, the estimated 
upper and lower confidence bounds for the logistic 0, denoted 
0u and 01, respectively, are then given by 0^ = h(fj and 
01 = h(fj, where h(*) equals exp (•)/(! + exp(")).^ 
^Restricting 0 and the confidence bounds to the zero-one 
interval, however, guarantees that the estimates of 0 will 
always be "significantly different from zero". As such, the 
restricted confidence bounds cannot be used to test for the 
presence of marginal cost pricing. 
Estimated Conjectural Elasticity and 
Corresponding 95% Confidence Interval 
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Figure 2. Estimated conjectural elasticity and corresponding 
confidence interval for the logistic specification 
of 0 
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The results of using this technique to create the 
restricted confidence interval for 0 are given in Figure 3. 
Again, however, I caution that imposing these restrictions on 
0 and its confidence interval make it meaningless to test for 
the presence of perfectly competitive behavior. 
In summary, although the estimates of the parameters in 
the various specifications for 0 are often insignificant, all 
three versions of the model fail to support any of the three 
theories discussed in Chapter 2. The next section discusses a 
plausible reason for the results I have obtained. 
Possible Reasons for the Results 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the three models tested in 
this dissertation lead to different predictions. Rotemberg 
and Saloner argued that oligopoly coordination will fall when 
demand is anticipated to be high, since the cartel will be 
forced to mimic more-competitive behavior to stave off any 
defections from the cooperative solution. Responding to the 
restrictive assumptions about the demand errors in the 
Rotemberg and Saloner model, Haltiwanger and Harrington 
developed a model predicting that coordination will fall 
during periods of falling anticipated demand. An alternative 
to these two cyclical models was presented by Green and 
Porter, who argued that cartel behavior responds to 
negative demand shocks, such that the degree of oligopoly 
78 
Estimated Conjectural Elasticity and 
Corresponding 95% Confidence Interval 
w 
Estimated 
Conjectural 
Elasticity 
Lower Confidence 
Bound 
Upper Confidence 
Bound 
Figure 3. Estimated conjectural elasticity and corresponding 
restricted confidence interval for the logistic 
specification of 0 
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coordination will be reduced following any significantly 
negative unanticipated decreases in demand. 
The results obtained, however, suggest the opposite 
occurred in the 1930s rayon industry. For example, in terms 
of the cyclical issues, the anticipated demand parameters 
(although they are often insignificant) from each of the three 
versions of the model suggest that coordination among rayon 
producers fell during the beginning stages of a boom, when the 
position of demand was anticipated to be rising yet still 
relatively low. 
One possible explanation of these results can be found in 
an approach that, unlike the game-theoretic models discussed 
in Chapter 2, provides a reason for why firms might choose to 
deviate from the cartel agreement during the beginning stages 
of a boom. That is, counter to the cartel compliance imposed 
by the game-theoretic models, there are two intuitive reasons 
for why defections from the cartel agreement might occur 
during periods of low and rising demand. First, given that 
demand is rising, the gains from cheating (relative to the 
joint-profit maximizing solution) are also rising. Second, 
following the approach taken by Stigler in which firms must 
infer rival cheating from reductions in their own sales, it 
"Recall from Chapter 5 that these results are not incon­
sistent with the comments of rayon representatives during the 
1930s. Many believed that cooperation was difficult during 
periods of low demand. 
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may be more difficult to detect cheating when demand is 
rising. That is, during periods of rising demand, firm sales 
may be rising, even though others are secretly cutting their 
prices below the cooperative price. Consequently, given that 
there are increasing returns from cheating and that the 
probability of being caught is lower, firms have a greater 
incentive to deviate from the cartel solution during such 
periods. 
As for the unanticipated demand issue, since the results 
show that the degree of coordination tends to increase after 
significant unanticipated reductions of market demand, this is 
counter to the Green and Porter prediction. Yet, again, 
rather than focus on a formal model of cartel behavior, an 
intuitive reason for this is offered by allowing for the 
possibility of periodic lapses in discipline. 
To begin, in all three versions of the model the sign of 
the DUM(-l) estimated coefficient is independent of the 
constant T (That is, regardless of which iteration of supply 
is estimated, the estimated coefficient of DUM(-l) is always 
positive.). Therefore, rather than focus on significantly 
^One weakness of this approach is that it lacks any 
rigorous attention to the information observed by the 
"cheaters" and the "non-cheaters". That is, "cheaters" wish 
to cheat because they perceive rising demand and, believing 
that "non-cheaters" do not also perceive rising demand, do not 
expect to get caught if they cheat. A formal, logically con­
sistent optimization model would require some attention 
towards asymmetric information. 
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negative shifts of demand, a reason is needed for why 0 might 
rise following any unanticipated drop in demand. The reason 
for this is actually quite simple. A fall in the unanti­
cipated portion of demand suggests that the observed quantity 
is lower than anticipated. Accordingly, any firm contem­
plating cheating might infer that the gains from cheating will 
be relatively low; and therefore, the firm will have a lower 
desire to cheat during such periods. Rather than defect from 
the cartel agreement, firms will then choose to continue 
cooperating, such that the degree of coordination will be 
higher (relative to periods when demand is higher than 
anticipated). 
The structure of the empirical model from Chapter 4 
imposes significant restrictions regarding the effects of 
anticipated demand on the degree of coordination in the rayon 
industry. The next chapter provides an extension of the 
analysis of cyclical model issues by developing and estimating 
a model which addresses the anticipated demand issues in a 
more rigorous manner. 
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CHAPTER 7. EXTENSIONS 
The assumptions imposed by the empirical model presented 
in Chapter 4 are quite restrictive. In particular, it is 
assumed that firms base their conduct today on the antici­
pation of only next month's demand. Yet, it is difficult to 
imagine that rayon producers ignored expectations of market 
conditions several periods into the future in determining 
their current behavior. The purpose of this chapter is to 
address this issue through the development of an empirical 
model designed to test for the presence of those features 
common to the two cyclical models presented in Chapter 2. 
Common Features of the Cyclical Models 
The two cyclical models discussed in Chapter 2 lead to 
quite different predictions. Rotemberg and Saloner's model, 
for example, relied on iid demand shocks to show that cheating 
is most likely to occur during booms, with a boom being 
defined as a period of relatively high demand. Yet, as noted 
by Haltiwanger and Harrington, the Rotemberg and Saloner 
assumption of iid demand shocks is unrealistic, since rising 
(falling) demand is likely to continue for several periods 
before abating. Therefore, focusing attention on the period-
to-period changes in demand, Haltiwanger and Harrington showed 
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that cheating is most likely to occur during the beginning 
stages of a recession, when the position of demand is rela­
tively high and falling. 
Although the predictions of these two models are dif­
ferent, they are nonetheless based upon two common principles. 
First, the incentive to cheat in both models is higher during 
periods of high demand, other things equal, because the gains 
from cheating are greater during such periods. Second, both 
models also maintain that the expectation of low demand in the 
future prompts cheating because it implies that the present 
discounted value of expected future collusive profits is 
lower. Firms have a greater incentive to cheat during such 
periods because the sacrifice of expected future collusive 
profits, that results from the punishment phase, is less 
costly. Consequently, in order to sustain cooperation over 
the business cycle, both models predict that the cartel will 
choose to mimic more competitive behavior during those periods 
when one or both of these two conditions exist. 
The next section of this chapter develops an empirical 
model to test whether or not these conditions affect the 
degree of oligopoly coordination. The model is estimated 
using techniques like those applied in Chapter 6, augmented 
with a procedure introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) 
for estimating the present discounted value of expected future 
profits. 
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Empirical Model 
Suppose firms operate under conditions of linear demand 
and linear marginal cost independent of output: 
Ot ^0 ®2^2t +  e ,  ( 7 . 1 )  
and 
MC{W,) = po + + P2^2t + PalVat + Vf (7.2) 
where Qt is industry output in period t, is the period t 
market price, is an appropriate period t price index, is 
the ith demand shifter observable in period t, is the jth 
marginal cost shifter in period t, and and v^ are error 
terms assumed to be uncorrelated with one another. Profit 
maximization then implies: 
't|l + = MC(P/t) / (7-3) 
where 6^ parameterizes the degree of oligopoly coordination in 
period t, and 6, the price elasticity of demand, equals 
[ (Pt/QJ ] . 
Next, assume that the current position of demand (as 
measured by the demand intercept) and the present discounted 
value of expected future industry profits affect the degree of 
coordination in the industry: 
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0J. - to + (7.4) 
where and the position of demand in period t and the 
present discounted value of expected future industry profits, 
respectively, are given by: 
Yf.  K g  +  ( 7 . 5 )  
and 
( 7 . 6 )  
where d is the discount factor, Tit is the level of industry 
profits (gross of fixed costs), and E(.[*] is the expectation 
conditional on period t information. Ut is equal to: 
where : 
and 
n, = Q,{Pt - MC{W,) ) 
= 
P = [1 -Po -Pi -Pz -Pa] 
( 7 . 7 )  
R. = 
PtOt 
Qt 
^2tOt 
^2tQt\ 
As suggested in the previous section, the degree of coor­
dination is expected to fall when the current position of 
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demand is high (Ti<0) and future profits are expected to be 
lower (T2>0). 
To establish the model, an expression for is needed. 
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), I assume that firms 
form their expectations of future profits using a vector 
autoregression (VAR) in H^, such that: 
= Affj.-! + Tit/ (7.8) 
where is an mxl vector containing current and lagged R^'s, A 
is an mxm matrix of parameters, and is an mxl vector of 
error terms for which is assumed to equal zero for all 
t and j greater than zero; and, accordingly, for 
all t and j greater than zero. Let D be the 5xm matrix of I's 
and O's that, when post-multiplied by H^, selects from it the 
elements of R^. That is, let: 
Rf. = DHf.. (7.9) 
Equation (7.6) then becomes: 
= , (V.IO) 
j=i 
which simplifies to: 
= prT (7.11) 
Rewriting the sum on the right-hand side of (7.11) yields: 
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T (dA)J - I 
3^0 
H, (7.12) 
where I is the mxm identity matrix. And using the matrix 
extension of a familiar result on infinite series, equation 
(7.12) reduces to: 
where : 
= pr[(J - dA)-^ - i]H^ 
- pFt 
(7.13) 
Ft = D[{I - dA)-^ - I] H^ = 
It 
2t 
3t 
4t 
5t 
(7.14) 
Substituting (7.5) and (7.13) into (7.4) and then substi­
tuting the result into (7.3) and rearranging, the supply 
relationship becomes: 
_ f^l«3 
[ «4 a. a. 
+ + Pliait + P2^2t + P3^3t + (7-15) 
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Before equation (7.15) can be estimated, though, the 
elements of must be constructed. This requires values for 
the matrices A and D, along with the vector H,. and some 
(assumed known) discount factor d. Suppose, for example, that 
H|. is taken to include a constant and current and once-lagged 
elements of Rf" Equation (7.8) would then become: 
1 
PtQt 
Ot 
^itOt 
^2t^t 
Ot-I 
1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
^0 '^1 ^2 
^0 ^2 -^10 
^0 ^2 
dQ 0. 2  • • • • • •  •  dio 
BQ 6^ ©2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0  
0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0  
1 0 0 
^10 Tilt 
•
Ot-i 
^2t 
^10 ^3t 
^2t-l^t-l 
^4t 
®10 X + Tlst 
0 •^t-2^t-2 0 
0 Qt-2 0 
0 ^lt-2^t-2 0 
0 ^2t-2^t-2 0 
0 . 
^3t-2^t-2 0 
[7.16) 
where the a^'s, bi's, c^'s, d^'s, and e^'s can be estimated from 
a VAR of Rt on R^.i and R^.g. Given this specification of Ht, 
the particular form of matrix D implicitly defined in equation 
(7.9) is: 
^^As will be shown in the next section, using one lag of 
the elements of R^ in the expression for is optimal (in the 
sense of minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion). 
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D = 
0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  
\l.ll) 
The model is estimated in three steps. First, the 
elements of the matrix A are estimated by applying VAR 
techniques to the equations in (7.16). Second, given the 
matrices A, D, and Ht, along with some given discount factor, 
the vector Ft is created using equation (7.14). Third, 
substituting Ft into the supply relationship, equations (7.1) 
and (7.15) are then estimated by 2SLS. The results from the 
application of this procedure to the rayon industry data are 
discussed in the next section. 
Estimation Results 
Using the rayon data defined in Table 5 from Chapter 6, 
the demand and supply equations (7.1) and (7.15), respec­
tively, become:^ 
TOTQ = Kg + ol^RSIP + a^RIPD + a^TIME + a^RRAYP + € (7.18) 
and 
^'Hereafter the time subscript t is dropped for simpli­
city. 
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rayp = po T:o + tiKp z*totq - rsip»z*totq 
I ti*:' 
I  «4 , 
ripd*z*totq 
I «4 J 
time»z*totq - -2 
(%r) f^'z'totq + Pit2l a. f.'z»totq + (4r) f,»z»totq 
93^2 
a. 
\f^*z'totq + pifvg + p2ivp + ^^time + v. (7.19) 
To construct the F/s (1=1,2,3,4,5), I begin by 
generating the parameters of the matrix A by estimating a VAR 
of R on its lagged elements, where: 
r = 
•rayp*totq 
totq 
wg'totq 
wp'totq 
time»totq 
[7.20) 
Following Mills (1990), the appropriate number of lags used in 
the VAR estimation is determined by minimizing the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) Table 11 lists the values of 
"Akaike's (1973) information criteria (AIC) is given by: 
AIC[q) = In 
where q is the lag length, e is the vector of residuals, and n 
is the number of observations. 
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Table 11. Values of the AIC for various lag lengths of R 
Lag Length Value of the AIC 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-2.59605 
-2.93275 
-2.74759 
-2.62400 
-2.32896 
-2.81280 
the AIC for various lag lengths and, as shown, the AIC is 
minimized using a lag of two months. Therefore, following the 
VAR methods described by Sims (1980), each variable in the 
vector R is regressed upon a constant and the one and two-
period lagged values of all of the variables in R. The 
parameters of the estimated matrix A and their corresponding 
t-statistics are given in Table 12. As indicated, the 
majority of the parameter estimates are significantly 
different from zero. 
Using the matrix D from (7.17), the vector H (which 
contains current and one-period lagged elements of R), the 
constructed matrix A, and a value of .995 for the monthly 
discount factor, the F^'s are then created using equation 
(7.14).^ Substituting the Fj ' s into the supply equation, 
^The discount factor d was assumed to equal l/(l+r), where 
r is the monthly interest rate of 1/2% (which compounds to 
slightly over 6% per year). 
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Table 12. Results from the VAR estimation of R 
Parameter Estimate t-stat Parameter Estimate t-stat 
ao . 0 8 5 * * *  5 . 5 2  bo 1 2 . 1 9 1 * * *  6 . 1 8  
2 . 0 4 5 * * *  3.61 bi 
bz 
1 4 8 . 8 5 9 * *  2.07 
32 -.007 -1.17 - . 2 5 8  -.33 
33 - 1 . 3 6 4 * *  -1.96 b) -173.083* -1.95 
34 .155** 2 . 4 9  bi 21.995*** 2 . 7 8  
35 . 0 0 0 1 * *  2.06 bs .015** 2 . 4 7  
36 - 1 . 0 7 3 *  - 1 . 8 8  be -142.829* - 1 . 9 6  
a^ .006 1.01 b? 1.036 1.32 
38 .846 1.25 be 9 9 . 6 8 3  1 . 1 6  
39 - . 1 9 4 * * *  - 3 . 0 6  bg - 2 7 . 8 3 8 * * *  - 3 . 4 5  
3 i o  -.0001 -1.06 bio -.008 -1.33 
Co . 0 9 1 * * *  6.19 do . 3 4 2 * * *  5 . 7 2  
c i  1 . 1 6 3 * *  2 . 1 8  di 4 . 3 5 1 * *  1.99 
C; -.009 -1.45 dz - . 0 4 4 *  -1.83 
C3 - . 5 9 4  -.91 dj -5.573** -2.07 
C4 .143** 2.44 d4 2.049*** 8 . 5 2  
C5 .0001*** 3 . 0 8  ds . 0 0 0 4 * *  2 . 2 8  
Ce -1.032* - 1 . 9 1  de - 3 . 2 9 9  -1.50 
C7 .007 1.18 dv . 0 3 9  1 . 6 4  
Ce . 8 9 3  1.40 de 2.074 . 8 0  
Cg -.184*** -3.07 d, - 1 . 2 8 1 * * *  -5.23 
c l o  -.0001* -1.79 dio -.0001 -.73 
So 6 1 3 . 7 3 5 * * *  5 . 2 9  
s i  8 5 7 8 . 1 2 0 * *  2 . 0 2  
e ?  -85.530* - 1 . 8 4  
e s  - 8 4 0 7 . 6 1 0  -1.61 
@ 4  1 2 5 4 . 6 5 0 * * *  2 . 6 9  
6 5  1 . 9 6 6 * * *  5.50 
@ 6  -7822.900* -1.83 
6 7  70.450 1.52 
e g  4979.250 . 9 6  
Gg -1571.950*** -3.31 
^10 -.606* -1.75 
*Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level. 
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(7.18) and (7.19) can now be estimated by 2SLS (nonlinear 2SLS 
in the case of supply). 
As in the previous chapter's analysis, the Durbin-Watson 
test rejected the absence of first-order autocorrelated 
errors. Therefore, both the demand and supply equations were 
first-differenced before they were estimated. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 13. 
Although several of the demand estimates are insigni­
ficantly different from zero, their signs appear plausible. 
For example, both the price of silk and the industrial produc­
tion index positively effect demand; whereas the estimated 
coefficient of the real rayon price indicates that demand is 
downward sloping. 
As for supply, most of the marginal cost coefficients 
that are significantly different from zero have reasonable 
signs. The rayon wage, for example, positively effects 
marginal cost; whereas, similar to the results from Chapter 6, 
the effect of the time trend on marginal cost is negative. 
The estimated Ti's, however, offer mixed results. On the 
one hand, the significantly positive estimate of T; does 
support the argument that coordination is likely to fall when 
the expectation of future profits is lower; however, on the 
other hand, the significantly positive estimate of Ti fails to 
support the prediction that coordination is most difficult 
when the position of demand is relatively high. 
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Table 13. Results from the estimation of demand and supply 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
Demand Parameters : 
«0 6 . 4 2 7  0.556 
«1 3 2 4 . 1 6 1 * *  2 . 0 4 1  
1 4 . 1 3 8 * *  2 . 0 7 4  
«3 0.057 0.781 
-1274.890 -1.025 
P d  0 . 6 5 0 * * *  8.171 
= .839 
DW = .728 
N = 91 
Supply Parameters: 
Po 0 . 0 0 4 * * *  3 . 9 0 3  
Pi 0.917*** 5.887 
P2 -0.009 -0.625 
Ps - 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 * * *  -8.495 
To - 0 . 0 1 3 * * *  -4.369 
Ti 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 * * *  2.750 
T2 0 . 0 0 0 6 * * *  4.104 
P s  0 . 6 6 0 * * *  8 . 4 3 0  
R2 = .94 6 
DW = .667 
N = 91 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at II level. 
Using the estimated t^'s, along with the previously 
outlined procedures to construct t-statistics, the estimated 
0t's and their corresponding t-statistics were created. 
Unfortunatley, though, the estimated 0t's, ranging from -.0003 
to .0006, were all insignificanty different from zero. 
Therefore, although this approach addresses issues that were 
95 
not addressed in previous chapters, the results obtained fail 
to concretely support the predictions of the two cyclical 
models. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, rayon producers during the 
1930s likely engaged in other methods of behavior. For 
example, producers likely used monthly inventories as a buffer 
against fluctuating sales. Moreover, price leadership likely 
played a dominant role throughout this period. The next 
chapter discusses these two issues in greater detail. 
CHAPTER 8. INVENTORIES AND PRICE LEADERSHIP 
Inventories and price leadership appear to have played 
significant roles in the conduct of rayon producers throughout 
the 1930s. Inventories were likely used to smooth production 
across fluctuations of market demand. Price leadership, on 
the other hand, appears to have been the primary coordinating 
device used in the industry throughout the 1930s." This 
chapter addresses the inventory and price leadership issues in 
the 1930s rayon industry. In the first section of this 
chapter monthly rayon inventory, sales, and production data 
are used to test for the production-smoothing role of inven­
tories. Emphasis is placed on the estimation of a simple 
stock-adjustment model of inventories. The second section of 
this chapter discusses the role of price leadership among 
rayon producers and links the observed structure of the 
industry to some recent price leadership models. However, 
since an adequate data set is unavailable to test some of the 
predictions of these price leadership models, Section 2 is 
qualitative in nature. 
"American Viscose Corporation was the dominant price 
leader throughout this period. 
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The Production-Smoothing Role of Inventories 
This section discusses the evidence for production-
smoothing in the 1930s rayon industry. It begins with a 
review of the relevant literature on production-smoothing. As 
discussed below, although there has been a lot of empirical 
evidence against production-smoothing, much of this evidence 
has been generated from questionable data. The section 
concludes with the application of rayon data to the issue at 
hand. Briefly, the results tend to support production-
smoothing among rayon producers. 
Recent literature on production-smoothing 
In production-smoothing models of inventory behavior, the 
desire for firms to smooth production across fluctuating 
demand can be supported by rising marginal costs and/or costs 
of moving production from one period to another." Although 
these models have considerable intuitive appeal, critics argue 
that evidence fails to support them on three key fronts. 
First, if inventories are used as a buffer against fluctuating 
sales, then we should observe a negative correlation between 
sales and inventories. Yet much of the data indicates a 
""See Blanchard (1983) for a detailed discussion of how 
costs influence the incentive to smooth production. 
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positive correlation between the two Second, production-
smoothing models suggest that sales should be more volatile 
than production. Many studies, however, show the variance of 
production exceeds the variance of sales. And third, much of 
the evidence used to support or refute production-smoothing 
has been generated from simple stock-adjustment models that 
lead to implausibly low estimates of adjustment speeds. 
Other research, however, has suggested that the evidence 
against production-smoothing may be questionable. For 
example, Fair (1989) argued that the observed higher variance 
of production over sales is often the result of poor data. In 
particular, much of the evidence against production-smoothing 
has been generated from highly aggregated data. Yet, as sug­
gested by Fair, it is more appropriate to use industry-level 
data when testing for production-smoothing. Similarly, 
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1987) noted that the time interval 
over which firms make decisions is often overlooked by critics 
of production-smoothing. For example, if firms respond to 
market conditions on a month-to-month basis, then the use of 
yearly or quarterly data would tend to obscure evidence of 
"Several recent theories have attempted to explain the 
positive correlation between inventories and sales. Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1989), for example, argued that since firms have 
the greatest incentive to cheat on a cartel agreement during 
episodes of high demand, inventories will be increased during 
these periods so as to threaten prospective cheaters with a 
more severe punishment (flooding the market with output) 
thereby deterring cheating. 
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production-smoothing. Given these criticisms of the previous 
empirical work on production-smoothing, the next generation of 
empirical studies should be undertaken at the industry-level, 
with careful attention to the relevant time frame of produc­
tion decision making. 
Prior work suggests that firms in the rayon industry of 
the 1930s may have engaged in production-smoothing. Accor­
ding to Markham, "It is apparent that price and output are 
greatly cushioned by inventory changes from sharp impacts of 
fluctuating demand.An extreme example of this may be found 
in the last half of 1937 and the early months of 1938: inven­
tories increased from 2.1 million pounds to 63 million pounds, 
an increase of 3000 per cent; yet over the same period output 
was decreased by only 33.5 per cent."*^ And further, given the 
nature of the technology and the structure of input markets in 
the rayon industry, it is likely that producers made produc­
tion and inventory decisions on a month-to-month basis. Thus, 
it may be fruitful to examine monthly rayon inventory behavior 
in a more rigorous manner. 
42jesse Markham, Competition in the Rayon Industry 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 131. 
'"ibid, p. 132. 
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Evidence of production-smoothing 
Preliminary evidence 
If rayon producers in the 1930s used monthly inventories 
to smooth production, as suggested in the subsection above, 
then (1) the correlation between monthly sales and inventories 
should be negative, and (2) the variance of monthly production 
should be smaller than the variance of monthly sales. Using 
monthly rayon sales, inventory, and production data, collected 
from Rayon Organon for the period October 1932 to June 1940, 
the results mildly support these two predictions. First, a 
simple regression of sales on inventories produced an esti­
mated slope coefficient that was negative at the 10 percent 
level of significance. Second, the sample variance of sales 
exceeded that of production by 11 percent, although an F-test 
failed to reject the hypothesis of equal population variances 
at conventional significance levels. At a minimum, therefore, 
these results suggest that a deeper analysis of production-
smoothing is warranted. Accordingly, results from the esti­
mation of a simple stock-adjustment model of rayon inventories 
are given below. 
Estimation of a stock-adjustment model 
The basic stock-adjustment model was originally developed 
by Lovell (1961). Firms are assumed to adjust inventories in 
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response to (1) deviations of actual sales from expected sales 
and (2) deviations of actual inventories from desired inven­
tories, such that the following equation holds: 
It - Jt-i = , (8.1) 
where is the level of actual inventories in period t, S/- is 
the level of expected sales in period t, is the level of 
actual sales in period t, and 1/ is the level of desired 
inventories in period t. 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (8.1), 
corresponding to unexpected sales, captures the role of inven­
tories as a means of smoothing production across fluctuations 
of demand. Yet, assuming desired inventories are a function 
of expected sales, any rapid changes in expected sales could 
lead desired inventories to exceed actual inventories. Conse­
quently, the second term on the right-hand side of equation 
(8.1) captures the motive of firms to adjust inventories in 
response to deviations of desired from actual inventories. 
The major difficulty with the estimation of this stock-
adjustment equation has been that the estimates of X and Ô, 
the adjustment speed coefficients, have often been close to 
zero.'''' For example, Feldstein and Auerbach (1976), using 
quarterly aggregate data, estimated X and Ô to each be less 
^See Blinder and Maccini (1991) for a review of the 
problems encountered with the stock-adjustment model. 
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than 0.06. This implies that inventory changes absorbed less 
than 6 percent of the difference between expected sales and 
actual sales and that less than 6 percent of the difference 
between desired inventories and actual inventories was cor­
rected within one quarter. As such, this provides little 
support to the use of inventories as a buffer against demand 
fluctuations. As previously mentioned, though, these implau­
sibly low estimates may be due to the use of highly aggregated 
data. 
Before equation (8.1) can be estimated expressions for 1/ 
and St® are needed. Following Metzler (1941), desired inven­
tories are assumed to depend linearly on expected sales, as 
given by: 
Substituting equation (8.2) into equation (8.1), and moving 
Ifi to the right-hand side of the resulting expression, the 
stock-adjustment equation becomes: 
Previous sales are likely to have a significant influence on 
expected future sales; and as such, several expressions for 
expected sales are tried. First, assume expected sales in 
period t equal sales in the previous period, such that: 
It = do + (8.2) 
Jt = Ôtto + - 5t) + àa^St" + (1-Ô) Jt-i' (8.3) 
5/ = = 5 El t • (8.4) 
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However, this is a very naive representation of expected 
sales. Following Akkina and Cram (1981), two moving average 
expressions for expected sales are also used: 
^ (8.5) 
and 
se ^  (gtr-i + ^ c-2 + ^ (8.6) 
Depending on which of these three formulations of 
expected sales were used, three different specifications of 
equation (8.3) were estimated. In all three cases, however, 
Durbin's h statistic rejected the null hypothesis of no first-
order autocorrelation of the error term. All three specifi­
cations, therefore, were corrected for first-order autocor­
relation. Due to the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable I^-i, the appropriate estimation technique employed 
was instrumental variables. 
^Specifically, equation (7.3) was estimated using the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure; where, depending on the repre­
sentation of expected sales, several sets of instruments were 
used. First, assuming expected sales equal the set of 
instruments used in the estimation of equation (7.3) included 
St, Sfi, industrial production, and a time trend. Second, 
assuming expected sales equal S^^^ the set of instruments 
included St, S^i, St_2, industrial production, and a time trend. 
And finally, third, assuming expected sales equal St^^ the set 
of instruments included St, S^i, Sfz, St.3, industrial produc­
tion, and a time trend. 
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The estimation results corresponding to the three 
specifications of expected sales are given in Table 14. The 
results indicate that in all three cases the estimated 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. Moreover, 
the inferred estimates of X and Ô, roughly 0.78 and 0.26, 
respectively, are quite plausible. In the case of X, for 
example, it indicates that approximately 78 percent of unanti­
cipated rayon sales were absorbed by inventory adjustment 
within a single month. This provides significant support for 
the role of inventories as a buffer against fluctuating sales. 
On the other hand, the estimate of Ô indicates that only 26 
Table 14. Estimation results from the stock-adjustment 
equation^ 
Variables St El St' !2 s E3 t 
Constant 31. 90 (5. 96) 31. 81 (4. 93) 30. 63 (4. 78) 
- St 0. 78 (16 .39) 0. 78 (17 .39) 0. 77 (16 .95) 
St* -0. 83 (-13.41) -0. 83 (-8 .71) -0. 81 (-5 .95) 
It-i 0. 74 (17 .24) 0. 74 (14 .26) 0. 76 (13 .64) 
Rhob 0. 97 (35 .09) 0. 97 (36 .40) 0. 96 (31 .98) 
R-Squared 0. 99 0. 99 0. 99 
Durbin h 7. 04 7. 04 6. 59 
Sample Size 89 88 87 
"t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
^Autocorrelation coefficient. 
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percent of the deviation between desired and actual inven­
tories were corrected within one month, suggesting a much 
slower adjustment speed of inventories to such deviations. 
These results, combined with the preliminary evidence 
cited earlier, indicate that production-smoothing was a likely 
rational for inventory adjustment in the rayon industry of the 
1930s. Therefore, unlike previous work on production-
smoothing that often relied on highly aggregate data, these 
results suggest that it may be more appropriate to analyze 
this issue at the industry level. 
As mentioned before, though, price leadership on the part 
of American Viscose was a likely method of rayon price deter­
mination throughout the 1930s. Therefore, the next section of 
this chapter discusses the role of price leadership in the 
1930s rayon industry. 
Price Leadership in the 1930s Rayon Industry 
Price leadership appears to be the prevalent method of 
oligopoly coordination among rayon producers in the 1930s. In 
fact, previous studies of rayon price behavior typically 
assumed that the price of the largest producer, American 
Viscose Corporation, was also the prevailing price for all 
rayon yarn. Further evidence of the central role played by 
this firm is provided by Table 15 which shows that the vast 
majority of the 28 prices changes between 1930 and 1940 
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Table 15. United States viscose yarn price changes, 1930-1940 
(lags and leads expressed relative to the price 
changes of American Viscose) 
Other Rayon Producers" 
American 
Viscose (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)= (7)" (8)-" 
1930: May 1 lag lag lag lag lag lag lag lag 
Jun 22 lag lag lag lag lag lag lag 
1931: Jan 9 lag lag lag lag lag lag 
Oct 23 lag lag lag lag lag lag 
1932: May 26 lag lag lag lag lag lag 
Jun 21 lag led lag lag lag lag 
Aug 22 lag lag lag lag lag lag 
Aug 29" 
1933: Apr 3 lag lag lag lag lag 
Apr 26 lag lag lag lag lag 
Jun 20 lag led lag led lag 
Jul 27 led lag lag lag lag 
1934: May 24 lag lag led lag lag 
Dec 13 lag lag lag lag lag 
Dec 31 lag lag lag lag lag 
1935: Apr 17 led lag lag lag lag 
Aug 8 lag lag lag lag lag 
Dec 30 led lag lag led lag 
1936: Jun 15 lag lag lag lag lag 
1937: Apr 12 led lag lag led led 
Dec 20 lag lag lag lag lag 
1938: Jan 14 same lag lag lag lag 
Jan 21 same lag lag lag lag 
May 20" 
Jul 29 lag lag lag lag lag 
1939: Sep 
Dec 
20 
4b 
lag lag lag lag lag 
1940: Jan 2" 
Source : Jesse Markham, Competition in the Rayon Industry 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 82. 
*The price changes of the following firms are listed in 
the table: (1) Du Pont, (2) Tubize, (3) Industrial, (4) North 
American, (5) American Enka, (6) Delaware, (7) Belamose, and 
(8) Skenandoa. 
^The price leader could not be determined. 
"For various reasons, Delaware, Belamose, and Skenandoa 
failed to report list prices after the dates at which their 
respective price change series' end. 
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were initiated by American Viscose. Moreover, the majority of 
the price changes in Table 15 were quickly followed, with the 
average price lag being 13.8 days.^ 
Recent studies of price leadership provide a degree of 
theoretical support to the designation of American Viscose as 
the price leader in the 1930s rayon industry. The study by 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1990), for example, uses a duopoly 
model of asymmetric information (regarding market demand 
conditions) to arrive at a collusive price leadership 
solution. In particular, given a stochastic market demand, 
the better informed firm is assumed to observe the realiza­
tions of the demand error; while the less informed firm only 
knows the distribution of that error. The designated follower 
must then decide whether or not to follow the leader's price 
changes. Providing the leader can use credible threats, 
however, cooperation (in the sense that the follower always 
follows) will be sustained in equilibrium. As Rotemberg and 
Saloner show, moreover, the less informed firm can always earn 
higher profits by choosing to follow (as opposed to lead) 
price changes. Therefore, unlike many of the previous models 
of price leadership, Rotemberg and Saloner's analysis shows 
that the better informed firm will emerge endogenously as the 
price leader. 
^Markham, p. 86. 
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Is it plausible that American Viscose had a greater know­
ledge of market demand conditions in the 1930s? According to 
Eckard (1982), the answer to this question may be affirmative. 
Eckard suggests that in a market with a stochastic demand, 
firms with larger market shares will be better informed about 
changing demand conditions. In support of this, he begins by 
defining the following stochastic industry demand equation: 
= f{k^,p^) , (8.7) 
where is total industry sales in period t, p^ is the market 
price in period t, and k^ is a random period t demand 
"position" parameter. Given some ex ante belief about k^ (say 
kt°), an ex ante optimal market price (say Pt°) is determined. 
Suppose there is some unexpected downward shift in market 
demand, associated with a fall in k^ from k^° to k^^. In order 
to respond with an appropriate price adjustment, firms need to 
be able to detect such a fluctuation. This can be accomp­
lished by forming an estimate of k^ and determining whether 
this estimate is consistent with k^". Eckard assumes that 
firms base their estimates of k^ on the most immediate source 
of information, namely their own recent sales experience. 
Following Stigler (1964), Eckard then assumes that firms 
compare their estimates to the expected value of k^ (condi­
tional on the assumption of no shift in demand) and then 
conclude, within certain probability confidence limits. 
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whether or not a change in has occurred.''^ If such a shift 
has occurred, the probability of detecting it, given the mag­
nitude of the shift, increases as the variance of the firm's 
estimate of k^ decreases. 
It is the effect of a firm's market share on the variance 
of the estimate of k^ that leads to the conclusion that larger 
firms are better informed about demand conditions. Speci­
fically, the lower the firm's market share, the higher is the 
variance of its estimate of k^ because of uncertainty 
regarding its actual share of industry sales or, alterna­
tively, a lack of knowledge of the sales experience of other 
firms relative to its own.""® The ability of firms to correctly 
infer fluctuations in market demand, therefore, is much higher 
for firms with higher market shares. That is, better informed 
firms tend to be those with higher market shares. 
Table 16 lists the market shares of the two largest rayon 
producers, American Viscose and Du Pont, for several selected 
years. These figures indicate that throughout the period 
cited American Viscose was the largest producer of rayon. 
Following Eckard, American Viscose may then have had a greater 
knowledge of market conditions (relative to its smaller 
Woodrow Eckard, JR., "Firm Market Share, Price 
Flexibility, and Imperfect Information," Economic Inquiry, 20 
(1982): 388-392. 
^®ibid, p. 390. 
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Table 16. Market shares of American Viscose and Du Pont 
Year 
Market Share of 1928 1931 1933 1935 1938 1942 
American Viscose 56 44 33 34 29 31 
Du Pont 20 15 16 17 15 16 
Source: Jesse Markham, Competition in the Rayon Industry 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 47. 
competitors). And, therefore, Rotemberg and Saloner's model 
provides theoretical support for the apparent role of American 
Viscose as the designated price leader in the rayon industry 
during this period. 
In conclusion, it appears that inventories and price 
leadership played active roles in the rayon industry of the 
1930s. The production-smoothing role of inventories appears 
to explain a great deal of the fluctuation in inventories 
throughout the 1930s. Price leadership, involving American 
Viscose, the largest producer at the time, as the leader of 
most of the price changes, appears to be consistent with the 
predictions of two recent models. 
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CHAPTER 9. SUMMARY 
Three recent game-theoretic models have yielded 
implications about the effects of demand movements on the 
degree of oligopoly coordination, with the key distinction 
among these models being whether demand movements are antici­
pated or unanticipated. The model by Green and Porter, for 
example, showed that coordination is most likely to decline 
following any significantly negative unanticipated demand 
shifts. On the other hand, Rotemberg and Saloner argued that 
coordination will fall when the anticipated position of demand 
is relatively high. This result, however, required the 
assumption that demand errors are identically and indepen­
dently distributed, which implies that an increase in demand 
today is no more likely to be followed by a further increase 
than by a decrease. Yet this is an unrealistic assumption. 
Customary business cycles tend to display positive serial 
correlation: Demand shifts of a given sign tend to be followed 
by shifts of the same sign. Adopting this assumption, 
Haltiwanger and Harrington modified Rotemberg and Saloner's 
model to show that the degree of oligopoly coordination will 
most likely fall when the anticipated position of demand is 
falling. 
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Prior empirical research on the effects of demand move­
ments on the degree of oligopoly coordination has largely 
followed the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCPP) 
relying, as it does, on cross-sectional studies of the effects 
of various business cycle measures on different proxies for 
market power. Due to several weaknesses of the SCPP method, 
however, the approach taken in this dissertation has been to 
address this issue through the application of new empirical 
industrial organization (NEIO) techniques to time series data 
from a single industry. 
There exists considerable anecdotal evidence that coor­
dination among firms in the 1930s rayon industry was likely 
affected by shifts of demand. For example, several members of 
the industry on occasion hinted that coordination was most 
difficult during periods of recession. An empirical model was 
developed in this dissertation to address the effects of anti­
cipated and unanticipated demand movements on the degree of 
coordination in the rayon industry of the 1930s. 
The results from the application of the empirical model 
failed to support any of the above three theories. That is, 
although parameter estimates were largely insignificant, the 
results suggest that coordination among rayon producers most 
likely fell during periods when the position of demand was 
anticipated to be relatively low and rising. Moreover, 
coordination seems to have risen following significantly 
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negative unanticipated demand shifts, contrary to the 
prediction of Green and Porter. Although these findings run 
counter to the results of the analyses of Rotemberg and 
Saloner, Haltiwanger and Harrington, and Green and Porter, 
they can be reconciled with the intuitive predictions of an 
informal theory of the timing of actual episodes of cheating 
on explicitly or tacitly collusive agreements. 
In view of the apparent failure of the Rotemberg and 
Saloner, Haltiwanger and Harrington, and Green and Porter 
theories to explain temporal variation in oligopoly conduct in 
the rayon industry, it would be interesting to subject the 
theories to additional tests using data from different 
industries. Perhaps results will correspond with these, where 
coordination appears most difficult during the early stages of 
a boom. 
Finally, this dissertation briefly examined two aspects 
of firm conduct in the rayon industry of the 1930s: price 
leadership and the production-smoothing role of inventories. 
The evidence suggests that American Viscose Corporation was 
the dominant price leader throughout the 1930s and that 
inventories were likely used as a buffer against demand 
fluctuations. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Equation (3.12): 
Consider n firms operating in a market, each of which has a 
cost function given by: 
Porter claims that under Bertrand, Cournot, and joint profit 
maximization, firm i's market share in period t can be written 
as : 
where Sit is independent of t. To see this, consider Bertrand 
behavior first. 
If all firms behave as Bertrand competitors, setting price 
equal to marginal cost, 0it equals zero for all i and t. Each 
firm's equilibrium condition in period t then becomes: 
cHqit) = ( 1 )  
1 
( 2 )  
(3) 
Solving for q^^, equation (3) can be written as: 
(4) 
Summing equation (4) over all n firms yields: 
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1 n 
0. (5) 
i=l i = l 
Using equations (4) and (5), the i"' firm's market share under 
Bertrand competition is then given by equation (2). 
Next, consider joint profit maximization. If firms maximize 
joint profits, 8^^ equals one for all i and t. Each firm's equi­
librium condition then becomes: 
p,(i + (A-l) 
Solving for q^^, we get: 
( 6 )  
<?it = 
PM * TX^ (7) 
which summed over all n firms becomes: 
1^1 
fv(i + 4) 
t (Si) IT&T 
2 = 1 
( 8 )  
Thus, firm i's market share in period t under joint profit maxi­
mization is also given by equation (2). 
Porter's claim that equation (2) holds under Cournot conjec­
tures (where equals (qit/Q) ) , however, can only be supported 
in the symmetric case, where is equal across all firms. In 
fact, as we have seen, although Porter's model differs from 
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Appelbaum's by allowing firms to have non-constant marginal 
costs, his model still requires Appelbaum's assumption that all 
n firms have a common conjectural elasticity. 
Given equation (2), the industry supply relationship (see 
equation (3.11)) becomes: 
1 
(9) 
which becomes : 
(10) 
From equation (2): 
1 
( 1 1 )  
Substituting equation (11) into equation (10), we get: 
(12) 
which becomes: 
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0 
P,{1 -y) = A Si 
i=l 
1-1 
Qc A-l (13) 
And for notational ease, we can write equation (13) as: 
Ptd + -y) = DQ^-\ (14) 
where ; 
D = X 
r^ i 
l-A 
This proves equation (3.12) 
